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Abstract:
In recent philosophy debates, conflicting views persist on the influence of
manipulation on moral responsibility of individuals. One side sees manipulation as
not different from any other deterministic environmental influence on the agent,
others advocate for historicism — the idea of deviant causal route — if manipulation
is present in the agent’s history. Historicist account of moral responsibility is based
on disruption of natural development, but this may not be trivial to detect in cases
of covert non-constraining control and social conditioning. In addition, opinions on
the resulting responsibility of the agent are influenced by intuitions on her identity,
locus of control and nature of motivating reasons. The aim of this thesis is to map
the recent debate and identify the factors playing the role while searching for the
borderline of responsibility of the manipulated agent.
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Abstrakt:
V současné filozofii probíhá debata o vlivu manipulace na morální odpovědnost
jedince. Jedni poukazují na to, že manipulace není odlišná od jakéhokoliv jiného
deterministického působení prostředí na agenta. Jiní přicházejí s historicismem,
ideou, že odpovědnost je citlivá na výskyt manipulace v kauzálním řetězci
předcházejícím činu. Historicismus stojící na narušení přirozeného vývoje může být
ale těžko obhajitelný v případech skrytého společenského podmiňování. Názory na
konečnou odpovědnost agenta navíc ovlivňují intuice o jeho identitě, kontrole a
původu důvodů, jež ho motivují k činu. Předmětem práce je současnou debatu
zmapovat a pojmenovat faktory vstupující do hry při hledání hranice odpovědnosti
manipulovaného agenta.
Klíčová slova: manipulace, morální odpovědnost, kauzalita, kontrola, historicismus
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1. Moral responsibility of manipulated agents
1.1 Moral responsibility
1.1.1 What is moral responsibility
What does it mean to hold someone morally responsible? As opposed to legal
responsibility, the moral one has only unwritten rules, which may cause differences
in opinions about what is relevant when ascribing it. There are no canonical ways
nor authoritative judges. As opposed to causal responsibility, the moral one includes
certain normative force. It seems to be at least a prerequisite for further moral
judgements about the agent. Beyond that, the definitions may vary, but it seems to
be the core of our common moral practices.
Are there any reasons to participate in holding others morally responsible or is the
whole concept an illusionary rationalization of unsubstantiated human custom? I do
not want to break down the Chesterton's Fence1 here. I suppose there is a system
created by someone for some purpose and while we may have data for some minor
changes, taking the whole practice away can cause serious problems in unforeseen
places. There are certainly crucial society-sustaining powers in the practice and
there are also significant critiques of the concept, especially of the practice
associated with it - praising and blaming2. While there may be better ways to react
to particular actions of an agent than praise and blame, keeping each other morally
responsible as a shared conceptual idea can have preventive power on its own. We
can also understand moral responsibility as a connection between agents and their
actions and secondarily the consequences of their actions, or more specifically
2 For example, Bruce Waller’s book
1 Chesterton’s Fence is a concept inspired by G.K. Chesterton’s story about a person who desired to
intervene and destroy a fence they did not see the use of. The point of the heuristic is not to remove
any system we have, unless we understand why it was built in the first place.
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between agents and their psychological states (intentions) regarding their action
without any relation to some consequent social reaction (such as blame).
Nevertheless, some philosophers understand moral responsibility simply as
blameworthiness3, which would be discussed in detail in chapter 2.2.
Moral responsibility is not attributed to agents by default. We can see it in contrast
with causal responsibility. Imagine a drunk relative tripped you on purpose at a
family party and you fell and broke the leg of a baby who was crawling on the carpet.
You are only causally responsible in this case, because you did not choose an action
even remotely similar to the outcome and you could hardly have prevented any of it
happening. It does not apply to your will either directly or in the sense of the
omission. Mele suggests that feeling terrible in this scenario, given what happened,
is normal, but it should not be mixed with feeling guilt4.
1.1.2 The origin of the debate
The roots of the debate lie in the problem of free will which has been here with us
ever since the origins of man. It started with old religious thinkers and the idea of
predestination and similar ideas leading to fatalism after opening a question: “If
God controls our lives and fates, why would we even try?” and transformed into a
similar problem with scientific causal determinism.
Philosophers gradually revealed a number of different things which free will could
mean. As a result, they defined that the kind of free will particularly endangered by
determinism is the free will needed for moral responsibility. Without free will and free
action, all our moral practice will seem meaningless.
In the 20th century, the following formulation of the problem of free will became
4 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 23
3 Alfred Mele, Manipulated Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 3
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established:
● Causal determinism means that if we know all physical laws and the initial
state of the world, we know all the following states, because those are
completely defined by the physical laws and previous states of the world.
● Free will means that we are the source of our action, our action is not defined
by things beyond us.
● Thus determinism rules out free will. If we live in a deterministic world, we
cannot have free will.
To save the room for free action, one can employ several strategies. The first view,
called libertarianism, denies that determinism exists. With the reference to quantum
physics, they mostly appeal to indeterministic phenomena, at least in the brain. The
second view, called compatibilism, accepts determinism and tries to redefine free will
in terms compatible with it. Mostly, they appeal to some kind of authenticity and
claim that indeterminism is just a kind of randomness and indeterministic free
action is not truly ours5. The last view is held by those who do not want to save free
action. It is called hard determinism and it states that since free will is not
compatible with determinism, it simply doesn’t exist. They may call it illusory and
still find reasons for societal practice of holding each other morally responsible or
they may criticize even the practice.
Despite the specification that we are concerned with free will needed for moral
responsibility only, the term free will remains ambiguous. Since the growing number
of philosophers did not feel the need to fight for it in its old, as Daniel Dennet would
say, magical6, form, in the recent papers, the problem is discussed increasingly as
6 In his book Freedom Evolves, Dennett uses an analogy of an elephant Dumbo who flies thanks to
waving his giant ears, but thinks that a magical feather he holds does it. Dennett thinks that we are
using freedom in the same superstitious way when we believe that it makes us an indeterministic
source of our action.
5 Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking Books, 2003)
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just moral responsibility. After a period of establishing so-called classical
compatibilist and classical libertarian accounts, a lot of critique followed and new,
less radical positions such as Semicompatibilism or Modest Libertarianism emerged.
The original three views branched out and now it seems that almost every
philosopher has his own view with his original approach. The focus on the questions
of determinism versus indeterminism and compatibilism versus incompatibilism
dichotomies fades slowly out and the emphasis is now more on different conditions
or capacities which make an agent a morally responsible being.
1.1.3 Ruling out alternative possibilities
The new era started with Harry Frankfurt’s compatibilist defense of the claim that
moral responsibility does not require the possibility to do otherwise, a standard
presupposition treated as given by both, compatibilists and incompatibilists. His
1969 examples are still discussed lively and referred to as Frankfurt cases. The case
features an agent, Jones, who is considering a certain action. Another agent, Black,
wants him to do that and is prepared to intervene, if he decides otherwise.
Eventually, Jones decides to perform the action Black wants him to do on his own.
His behavior was voluntary and it does not seem reasonable to excuse him from
moral responsibility, yet he “could not have done otherwise”, because Black has the
powers to ensure he will have his way.
The conclusion is that it does not matter if the agent is causally determined. What
matters is if they acted out for their own reasons. Other philosophers followed with
their own ways to reject the possibility to do otherwise or as it was called by
Frankfurt: Principle of alternative possibilities7.
7 Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) defines as “a person is morally responsible for what she
has done only if she could have done otherwise.”,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alternative-possibilities/
11
Semicompatibilists such as Fischer claim that moral responsibility is possible even
though determinism is incompatible with the ability to do otherwise8. Fischer and
Ravizza are distinguishing guidance control and regulative control. While regulative
control means both the power to perform an act and the power to freely do
something else instead, guidance control does not require access to alternatives. We
can imagine an agent driving home and guiding themselves to turn right regardless
of whether it was open to them to turn left9. For Fischer and Ravizza, only the
guidance control is necessary for moral responsibility.
In any case, we can imagine having alternative possibilities in different degrees of
realism, or lack there of. From being open to anything, so I can toss a coin and act
accordingly, to being physically tied up somewhere, but with the option to bite my
little finger off and escape if I really want to. Philosophers gradually came to the
conclusion that the difference between free and unfree agency lies in how much we
act on the basis of our own psychological structures (such as beliefs or desires)
compared to what others want from us or what the situation demands.
One of the greatest contributions to the discussion was made by Alfred Mele. He was
the first one who refused to support either determinism or indeterminism and
instead argued for both sides and tried to find accounts of free will and moral
responsibility for both libertarians and compatibilists. In his book Autonomous
Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy, he supports Daniel Dennett’s idea that if
there is some indeterminism along the way to our decision, it should be in the early
phase of generating the options, not immediately before the decision itself as
suggested by libertarians.
9 John M. Fischer a Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33
8 Fischer, John. 1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 1994, p. 180
12
He claims that we can have a regular free will defined by negative conditions, in the
sense that we were not forced to do so, without having the kind of free will
suggested by the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.
He described that the idea of alternative possibilities, which is something libertarians
really cling to, means for them that we can do otherwise in the possible world with
the same past and laws of nature up to the moment of the decision. But this is not
needed, we can contend that a broader range of worlds is admissible for tests of the
relevant kinds of ability10. We can have the freedom needed for moral responsibility
only in a sense that we could have done otherwise in similar possible worlds.
Another way to explain the sense in which we have the freedom needed for moral
responsibility even under determinism is by comparison with a compulsive person.
Mele writes that the dif a compulsive hand washer, is that he washed his hands
freely and his action had some moral significance, although both could have been
causally determined to do so11. I would add that the moral significance is there
because there were some reasons behind Mele’s decision to wash his hands.
1.1.4 The current debate and Vargas’ point of view
Thanks to the Frankfurt cases, the attention turned to reasons for an action.
Accounts which have the ability to respond to moral reasons in their center are
called reasons-responsive. It seems that the majority of the theories at least count on
some reasons-responsiveness. It could be characterized as “capacities for being
appropriately sensitive to the rational considerations that bear on their actions12”.
Besides this characteristic, moral responsibility is seen increasingly as a social
practice. It was not always the case. The idea that agents exercise some kind of
12 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/#ReasRespView
11 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 28
10 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 18
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metaphysical control, and based on that, they truly deserve praise or blame was
quite common13. These accounts were called merit-based views and it seems that
they are only slowly in retreat thanks to the critics such as Pereboom or Waller. The
alternative approaches claim that there is nothing which makes an agent truly
deserve some reaction, but it is appropriate to react if it would likely lead to changes
in agent’s behavior. It assumes that there is a human who is able to learn and modify
his behavior in the future thanks to the reactions, and maybe some other humans
who are looking and learning which behavior gets praise or blame. The point is to
give the agents incentives to act on, encouraging them in certain choices to secure
positive behavioral outcomes in the future14.
Manuel Vargas summarizes it as follows: “We have all we need if we hold that blame
is beneficial to the extent to which agents are moved to improve their behavior.”
His book Building Better Beings is one of the recent efforts to build a theory of moral
responsibility on the foundations of reason-responsiveness. His innovative theory is
standing on revisionism of the notion of free will inspired by Daniel Dennett. He
describes that our responsibility practices are justified by appealing to their
suitability for fostering moral agency and the acquisition of capacities required for
such agency and calls it the agency cultivation model15.
Vargas’ approach is strong in the social dimension of moral responsibility. He claims
that it is dependent on the features of the agent as well as on the features of the
environment. Yet, the environmental features he is discussing are mostly about the
social environment and he does not provide many situational clarifications. I will
also argue further in the text that his reactions to manipulation cases depend on
15 Manuel Vargas, Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), p. 3
14 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/
13 Gary Watson, ”Free Action and Free Will”, Mind CXVI (1987)
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reason-responsiveness way too much. In spite of that, Vargas did a good job in
mapping all the recent issues in moral responsibility theory. He also provided
valuable comments on various manipulation cases, therefore Building Better Beings
will be the primary source of the thesis.
After the principle of alternative possibilities lost relevance, new interpretations of
free agency emerged. In the search for a new solid basis on which we can explain
moral responsibility, multiple new definitions of conditions for moral responsibility
were stated and this started the era of manipulation arguments. In one of the larger
branches of the discussion, so-called manipulation arguments gradually prevailed.
They appeal to our intuitions and show that the definitions of a morally responsible
agent established in various, mostly compatibilist, accounts are not sufficient.
1.2. On manipulation
Manipulation could be perceived as something precluding moral responsibility but
there is no consensus about it. It is more subtle than coercion and often seen in
advertising, politics and in both professional and intimate relationships. If physical
restraint and threats are already seen as something elevating moral responsibility
from the victim, but the villains’ strategies are changing and employing
manipulative strategies on scale, we should consider to specify the borders in a
different way than via the concept of free will. The problem is social and mass media
influence which can be abused in noncoercive ways, as shown by the recent research
in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive science. Thanks to its range, it
can have even worse consequences than forcing an individual physically.
Allen Wood says that advertising corrupts the root of rational communication. It
manipulates people into acting on impulses and in their most immediate and
self-interested preferences, discounting both our own long-term interests and the
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interests of others. It leads to inequalities in wealth and power16. The long-term
harm is not only in the debt traps and destroyed families as a final destination for
those who cannot see through business models of various corporations. Political
advertising also embodies serious risk of radicalization and lives destroyed not only
to the consumers of the advertising.
A recent example is a case of Mr Balda, a retired citizen of Czechia who lived in fear
caused by anti-islamic political advertising, and decided to derail a train and made it
appear that islamists did it to make people believe in the threat as well17. How was
he manipulated? By certain speech, suggestive pictures, chain emails? Manipulation
is not easy to specify, but while it is difficult to find some common features of it, it
doesn’t mean that there is nothing.
Manipulation entails some kind of moral failure itself, manipulating person acts on
dishonesty instead of explaining and grounding the desired outcome we need others
for. There is a discussion going on if manipulative acts are wrong by definition or if
it just implies some moral reason to refrain from. Being manipulative may be
distinct from its moral status, when we for example admirably manipulate someone
into sitting quietly18. We can have the same discussion about white lies, but I want
to focus on the moral responsibility of the manipulated agents, regardless of if
manipulation is itself wrong as a tool or just thanks to its goals. If the manipulator is
responsible is a separate question.
1.2.1 Global manipulation
18 Coons, Manipulation: Theory and Practice
17 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46862508
16 Allen Wood in Christian Coons-- Michael Weber, Manipulation: Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014)
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In the real world, we know we may be manipulated by others to do things we would
not have done, but their arguments and other persuasions changed our mind. By
current definitions, this does not rob us of free will or the ability to act freely in the
way required for moral responsibility. We could have resisted the sales pitch or
subtle manipulative press and might blame ourselves later for not doing so19. To
emphasize that the agent (victim) was deprived of free will, manipulation arguments
introduce global manipulation. Those imaginative scenarios often include covert
intervention implementing radical reprogramming of agent’s beliefs, desires, and
other mental states via neurological engineering20.
1.2.2 Manipulation cases and its kinds
The idea of manipulation arguments is to assemble a pair21 of cases where agents did
the same action. In the first, the agent freely decided to do so, in the second the
agent was manipulated in a way that we would not intuitively see him morally
responsible. If the tested condition for moral responsibility is a valid one, it should
not be present in the latter case and the agent should be rendered non-responsible.
However, the author of the argument claims that both agents fulfill the condition of
the theory for being morally responsible and there is no relevant difference between
them according to the theory. This means the theory, or at least its condition for
moral responsibility, is wrong.
Christopher E. Franklin distinguished three types of global manipulation arguments.
(1) God-like manipulation argument where the agent is designed by a powerful
being which can predict all his actions and design them in a way which will lead to
desired events.




(2) Brainwash-like manipulation argument introducing evil neurosurgeons or
psychologists which covertly manipulate agent’s psychological states.
(3) Natural causes manipulation argument which employs natural but extraordinary
causes such as brain tumor, which can influence agent’s reason-responsiveness22.
The characteristic of the cases which have all the types in common is that the
manipulation is covert, preventing the agent from reflecting on their situation. If we
lack critical information about the situation we are in, we can follow the steps we
otherwise would not follow.
For example, if we often see in the media information about oceanian terrorism and
illigal immigration in our state, there is a reason to think that we are in danger. But
if we know additional information that it is a strategy of politicians who own the
media to evoke this feeling in us, the probabilities will change and we can change
our behavior completely as Bayesian reasoning under uncertainty tells us.
Another common feature is that there is another intentional agent and there is an
asymmetry in powers between the manipulator and the agent which is abused. It
could be misuse of information, knowledge, power or just the situation.
The role of the manipulation cases is not only to test and reject theories and their
condition for moral responsibility. We can take it the other way around and test our
intuitions about the cases. Regardless of what our strategy is, counterexamples can
also serve us as an important indicator of the knowledge gaps in how we understand
human decision-making. In addition, the reactions to manipulation cases are a
valuable peek into the thinking of various philosophers. It shows us which aspects of
the situation play a role in their accounts outside of the circumstances they modeled
for themselves and what is important for them.
22Christopher E. Franklin, “Plausibility, Manipulation, and Fischer and Ravizza”, The Southern
Journal of Philosophy 44 (2006), p. 173-192
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Because manipulation is a special case where the agent themselves is seriously
mistreated, it forces us to think about them as not so idealized agent able to process
all the information and rationally evaluate their desires. If too much mistreatment is
present, we should not ask if the agent is responsible but who from the influencing
agents in the causal chain is responsible for the result.
1.2.3 The Zygote argument and the perspective of a bounded being
I mentioned that we are bounded beings. By that I mean that we have limited
resources and limited points of view. We have to reach a decision in a limited time
with limited information, attention and cognitive capacity. This applies to us as an
agent and also as a moral judge. One kind of manipulation argument introduces
God-like powers. It is, for example, Mele’s Zygote argument:
A Goddess Diana placed a zygote in Mary, because she knew all the causal routes in
the future including that Ernie will be born and at the age of 30, he will perform an
act, which Diana desired.
Mele suggests that in comparison with Bernie, who went through the same causal
routes as Ernie and did the same thing at age of 30 but was born without Diana’s
intention and intervention, Ernie is not morally responsible for his action. The
problem I have with this case is that we are judging it from a god-like perspective. In
a normal world, we will never know what Diana did. If it really happened, we will
make an imperfect judgement and perhaps be unfair to Ernie. But it is ok, we are
bounded beings, the common practice is to judge agents morally responsible from
grounds we have, not from ideal grounds we cannot even imagine being real. Of
course if we get to know that Diana did it, we can judge Ernie not morally
responsible. However, there is a chance that in a world, where we can overhear
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goddess Diana’s bragging about how she put the zygote in Mary, some different
moral rules will exist, since you have to expect people being toyed by Gods. There is
one more reason to think that we should still judge Ernie for his deed: the
forward-looking effects. Maybe Ernie performed the act Diana wanted now, but we
can prevent it happening in the future.
Note that Mele’s definition of moral responsibility is “being blameworthy”. Is this
the kind of moral responsibility worth wanting? Ernie could be responsible in a
broader sense: If he now has a structure allowing him to perform the act Diana
wanted and the structure could be reformed, it makes sense to hold him morally
responsible at least in a sense that he is the one who should be shown how to do
things properly. In addition, people who are judging characters more than separate
acts would be inclined to judge Ernie nevertheless.
The original goal of the Zygote argument was to show that Ernie fails to be a source
of his action thanks to the manipulation. It is also meant to show that there is no
difference relevant to many compatibilist accounts between a person with a
manipulated zygote and any person in a deterministic universe. That is because we
are defined by the previous stages of the universe in both cases, and don’t have free
will in the sense of alternative possibilities or ultimate control over the situation.
Ernie is described as a person who fulfills all the conditions for moral responsibility
a Frankfurt-like compatibilist has: he is mentaly healthy, self-controlled and
definitely not compelled or coerced to perform the act. But still, he seems to be
failing to be a proper source of his action and Mele thinks compatibilists have to bite
the bullet by saying he is nevertheless responsible23. I would like to take two things
from this: (1) social practice is always practiced from a human point of view, we have
to accept that we do not have all the information about the agent and we are
sometimes judging them even though they were determined or
23 Alfred R. Mele, “Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting”, The Journal of Ethics 17
(2013), p. 167-184
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non-deterministically caused to do that and (2) that it is all right because this is a
core of social practice and by giving them feedback, we are also giving them the
incentive to rebel against the causal factors and consider other options in the future.
Even without a goddess Diana, we could have been defined by a more sophisticated
person at the moment and moral social practices exist here to make people stop,
think and evaluate any negative influences on their life which could be reverted by
reflection. Instead of drawing the conclusion to one side by saying that Ernie is also
morally responsible or to another by saying that Bernie is also not responsible, we
can focus on the difference24 in the freedom status of the two agents and look for
ways to prevent the situation so that more people are not manipulated by Diana.
1.2.3 Definition of the playing field
Ruling out determinism and indeterminism discord
There are already various examples showing that modified manipulation cases could
be a bullet-biting problem also for libertarian accounts of free will. They are
discussed in papers by Haji and Cyupers25 or Mele’s student Taylor Cyr26. For
illustration, here is a variant of the Zygote Argument mentioned by Cyr and
originally constructed by Stephen Kearns27 which works in an indeterministic
scenario:
“Diana creates a zygote Z in Mary. She combines Z’s atoms as she does
because she wants the zygote to develop into an agent who performs a certain
set of actions over the course of his entire life. From her knowledge of the
27 Stephen Kearns,. “Aborting the Zygote Argument”, Philosophical Studies 160 (2012), p. 379-89.
26 Cyr
25 Ishtiyaque Haji -- Stefaan E. Cuypers, “Libertarian Free Will and CNC Manipulation”, Dialectica 55
(2001), p. 221-238.
24 And I think that the difference is not in the structure of the agent or it is certainly not the thing
that would help us in the prevention program.
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state of the universe just prior to her creating Z and the laws of nature of her
indeterministic universe, she deduces that a zygote with precisely Z’s
constitution located in Mary will develop into an ideally self-controlled agent,
Ernie. As Ernie lives his life, there is a small chance every few seconds that
Ernie is incapacitated due to the way Diana created his zygote. If Ernie is
never so incapacitated, then he performs that set of actions that Diana has
planned. As it happens, Ernie is never incapacitated and performs all those
actions Diana has planned. (2012:385 , emphasis original)”
We can modify even the original Frankfurt case, where Black is watching over Jones
and is prepared to intervene, to make it indeterministic. I believe it was done
originally by Peter van Inwagen and the only difference is that Black has only a 98%
chance that his intervention would be successful. I consider these arguments
convincing and believe that we can discuss the issue of manipulation and moral
responsibility without considering determinism or indeterminism. We can be
agnostic about it just as Mele was from the beginning.
Defining the goal
In the next chapter, I want to analyze factors that play a role in judging manipulated
agents responsible or not responsible and present which of the factors are important
for philosophers. Particularly for Manuel Vargas, and Alfred Mele as an author of the
manipulation cases who provided a powerful critique of the conditions for moral
responsibility defined by various philosophers, namely Harry Frankfurt.
All of this is just to prepare the grounds for analyzing manipulation cases and
showing through them that moral responsibility is a complex phenomenon which
depends heavily on other concepts in our theories. Even concepts seemingly distant
from the domain of ethics make us assume some features of responsibility and this
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may be revealed by borderline cases, such as manipulation ones. Some undeniable
ambiguity is inherent to the concept of moral responsibility, but manipulation cases
show us the limits which can at least in a negative way say something about it, or at
least about philosopher’s ideas about it.
There are two approaches to define moral responsibility: (1) by negative conditions
(the same way as we excluded physical restraint and coercion) and (2) by positive
structural conditions. I would like to show that manipulation could be a candidate
for moving among the negative conditions.
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2. A unique way to fail in doing good
2.1 Three accounts versus factors influencing our judgement
I mentioned several approaches to moral responsibility. The greatest detail will be
given to Vargas’ Reasons account. It will be compared mainly with Mele’s historicist
account and Frankfurt’s Real Self account.
The goal is to describe what a function of blame is for them, what their
understanding of control is and which other factors are influencing their final
judgments of manipulated agents. There are many aspects of responsible agency we
can focus on. It is even hard to discover which of the aspects are the same, but
named differently by various philosophers. This chapter will start with Vargas’
concept of blameworthiness, which contrasts with those of Mele and Frankfurt and
judges manipulated agents from a completely different angle. I will go through
several differences caused by whether we imagine moral responsibility as when the
agent is accountable for something or something is attributed to them. Before I start
discussing the particular factors, I would also suggest a neglected attribution
problem, which can affect the further development of moral practice.
From the factors, I will discuss Frankfurt’s definitions of control. Vargas is sceptical
that there is a single control condition28 or a cross-situationally stable mechanism
constituting a unified capacity. His reasons-responsiveness is meant to be a cluster
of more specific, ecologically limited capacities29. His account will be explained in
detail in the next chapter. Mele has his own positive account on control (or maybe
several ones he constructed to satisfy libertarian and compatibilist positions), but I
will focus mainly on his original arguments to support a type of control which is
usually neglected by philosophers - the character control.
29 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 205
28 Vargas, Building Better Beings,p. 223
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Other two factors which I will mention in this chapter will be the overall capacity for
moral responsibility and the concept of reasons.
Conceptual factors
Several factors play a role in judging agents to be morally responsible for their
actions. I would like to divide them into three broad categories: conceptual, external
and structural. Conceptual factors are our assumptions or ideas about neighboring
philosophical problems. Their details influence our concept of moral responsibility
and our resulting responsibility judgement. I will start with those suggested by
Manuel Vargas30. He wrote that “one’s reaction to manipulation cases is partly
structured by: (1) whether one operates with an internalist conception of reasons; (2)
whether one imagines manipulation cases as replacing control structures; and (3)
how one thinks about personal identity.” But this is not a full list. Other factors could
be (4) our conception of character, (5) whether we treat blame as forward- or
backward-looking, which is connected with the question of whether we emphasize
fairness or benefit, and (6) whether we focus on accountability or attributability. I
would say that there are more hidden factors such as preferred moral theories which
would play a role, but it is impossible to capture them all.
External factors
External factors, on the other hand, are something which could be checked by
investigators. They are everything which is already decisive in the investigation of
crimes: use of force or threats, creating pressure, unauthorized intrusion into
private property, concealment of mandatory information and similarly non-violent
but still dangerous wrongdoings e.g. illegal selling methods. They include
observable causal involvement and also observable consequences of the action. The
30 Vargas, Building Better Beings,p. 278
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consequences are somewhat controversial, because a significant part of moral
approaches (e.g. kantian) is that one cannot blame an agent who caused something
without ill will. These cases of omission or trying our moral luck are discussed in
detail by Mele31, but in ordinary moral practice, we just get more blame, if we were
unlucky. The amount of blame for the actual consequences also depends on a
role-specific expectations as recent studies show32. We blame managers more than
ordinary workers. In general, everyone with a greater formal or informal role or from
whom society expects more, gets more blame.
There are also historical external factors, something that happened long before the
event and formed the agent's beliefs, character and the way they are interpreting
their perceptions. I believe that it is to some extent the same thing as the conceptual
structures we suppose in the agent. We can think the same of internal agential
structure, a kind of learned reason-responsiveness, and a series of forming historical
events that led to the current event. We can claim that the cause of an agent’s selfish
behavior is his psychological structure with selfish character or we can say that it is
the continual behavior (series of forming events) of his pampering mother. In some
cases the first one will be easier to check, but in the context of one-time events only
the second could be used as evidence.
Structural factors
Psychological structures are an especially problematic part. They are often assumed
but rarely explained in sufficient detail. Some capacities of the agent are easily
testable. We can see if a person we talk to is mentally ill. However, people could be
impaired in many ways and that is why philosophers came up with definitions of
32 Pascale Willemsen, Albert Newen and Kai Kaspar, “A new look at the attribution of moral
responsibility: The underestimated relevance of social roles”, Philosophical Psychology 31 (2018), p.
595-608
31 Alfred Mele, Free Will and Luck (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006)
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capacity for moral responsibility and several other conditions claimed to be
constituted in actual or hypothetical33 structures internal to the agent.
The capacity for moral responsibility is sometimes also discussed as autonomy34.
There are two approaches to autonomy. First, the traditional one is individualistic
and it focuses on the agent and its features only. That includes Frankfurt’s account
and basically all philosophy until the 20th century. The other one started to become
popular in recent years and is called relational autonomy. Catriona Mackenzie
defined it as follows: “persons are embodied, and socially, historically and culturally
embedded, and their identities are constituted in relation to these factors in
complex ways35”. If we satisfy conditions for self-governance, we reach autonomy as
both a capacity and a status concept. That means we are socially and politically
recognized as having both authority over our choices and the power to act on that
authority36. The conditions are usually defined as structural features of the agent
according to the individualistic approach but they are in relation to the external
world and situations in relational autonomy approach. I won’t be using the term,
but I wanted to point out that Mele’s historicism and even Vargas’ emphasis on the
social dimension of moral responsibility are part of a bigger shift in current
thinking. The right agential structures are considered the main internal condition
for agents to be morally responsible, so how we imagine them is the biggest factor
for the final judgement of responsibility of manipulated agents.
36 Katrina Hutchison, Catriona Mackenzie, Marina Oshana, Social dimensions of moral responsibility
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 61
35 Catriona Mackenzie, “The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of
Vulnerability”, in Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers & Susan Dodds (eds.), Vulnerability: New Essays
in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 33
34 Alfred Mele,. “Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy”, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995)
33 In either way, we do not have a direct access into an agent’s thoughts and self reports could be
biased by default in their favor. I would consider structural factors being closer to conceptual ones,
because the reconstruction of what is going on in an agent's head is, at least at the current level of
science, a pure concept. Even the existence of a possible motive for a crime does not prove that the
agent was really considering it.
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2.2 Judging agents morally responsible
2.2.1 Moral responsibility versus blameworthiness
As I wrote in the first chapter, Mele and other philosophers treat moral
responsibility the same way as blameworthiness. It is a valid definition if our goal is
to analyze the state of the art. The advantage is that if we ask “Is this agent
blameworthy?” instead of “Is this agent morally responsible?” it employs our
intuitive grasp of social behavior and we feel that there is or is not a right moment
to blame based on our experiences. However, it is just a proxy for judging agents
morally responsible. I would define a morally responsible agent as an agent in the
causal chain which could be reformed by reflection, the agent can learn based on our
(or their own) judgement. If we investigate the crime scene, we look first for the
suspects, and then decide what kind of intervention is suitable to prevent the event
next time. Bruce Waller defines moral responsibility as what justifies blame and
praise and adds that it is a condition for claiming what one deserves (e.g. giving
praise). This is grounds for him and another important critical philosopher, Derk
Pereboom, to reject the habits about moral judgements, or at least in Pereboom’s
case, the idea that agents truly deserve moral judgements. I would not say that they
deserve the intervention whatever it is. Just deserts require a knowledge of an
omniscient being, because who are we to judge what an agent truly deserves? Maybe
the only intervention we all deserve is in an ideal world with an infinitely patient
teacher who will take time to make us understand the consequences of everything.
But as we are bounded beings, we are trying our best to give others the feedback and
sustain our society. Blame and praise are just some basic but consensual tools for
how to do it. We can find a better tool for giving others feedback, for example
replacing the blame with explanation. It also depends on our limited understanding
of the situation, so I would be careful in saying that someone deserves blame.
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Luckily enough, the question of appropriate reaction to manipulated agents is here
regardless of whether the agent truly deserves it.
A good illustration to show the differences could be children. They have the capacity
to be morally responsible, but it is reasonable to assume that they are in a situation
they never encountered. That would make them not-blameworthy, at least not in the
character judging sense. We should make another intervention rather than blame:
explain what situation they were in. We may also say in a davidsonian way that
expressing that someone deserves praise or blame is no different from
disquotational function of truth and we are basically just recommending a particular
linguistic action, i.e. saying “you should blame him as well to create pressure”. No
matter how much I would like to see moral responsibility and blameworthiness be
treated separately, it is not what Mele and Vargas do, so I also will treat the terms
interchangeably.
Vargas claims that being responsible agents entails also considering ourselves a
self-governed person. We have to be an element in its own right, conceiving
ourselves as ones who can self-govern and then actually do govern ourselves in light
of moral considerations37. For me, it implies that he recognizes that there is not a
distinct switching point when we can say “from now on, you participate in the
responsible agency system on your own”. It is a mere ritual of adulthood. While it is
necessary to claim ourselves generally responsible at some point, in some situations
(especially cases including online communication, where our ordinary intuitions
about whom to trust could be misleading), it is plausible to suppose that the agent is
still learning.
More research on what, beyond the performing agent, caused an event can help us to
target remedial efforts more efficiently and in a more fair way.
37 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 230
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2.1.2 Vargas’ forward-looking blameworthiness
Although, in the rest of Vargas’ book he treats blameworthiness in the same way as
moral responsibility, in the chapter dedicated to Blame and Desert, he claims that in
his view of a Reasons account “standards for blameworthiness (holding fixed
satisfaction of the responsible agency standards) are more demanding than the
standards for responsible agency.38” But he merely means that the fact that an agent
is a responsible agent in general does not say anything about his blameworthiness in
a specific situation.
He explains further that “In our present circumstances, we are already generally
committed to the notion that some failures of knowledge are non-culpable, even if
there is some sense in which the agent could have taken steps to make him- or
herself aware of the relevant considerations.”
He warns against too much pressure on epistemic condition, because if blame
avoidance becomes extraordinarily difficult, we run the risk of discouraging
widespread commitment to the practice of responsibility39.
That means there is some room for agents to fail to respond to considerations that
could have been anticipated and to be morally responsible in general without
entailing blameworthiness in a particular situation. His demarcation criterion for
blameworthiness would be, in the end, a defect in the agent’s level of concern as
required by morality, i.e. ill will. Vargas rejects Pereboom’s notion of basic desert,
but holds that a plausible account of desert is given by something called the social
self-governance model of desert. In this model, the desert is based on prescriptive
theory characterizing what sorts of practices make sense given the agency
cultivation model and our current arrangement of our psychological dispositions,
39 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 237
38 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 236
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inherited social practices, and the like40. This is way more flexible than imagining
desert as a description of what we do or what we are. Even when Vargas identifies
moral responsibility with blameworthiness, for me, it looks like this forward-looking
account on moral responsibility leaves the possibility that something other than
quality of will might serve as a better account of blameworthiness. This could be
true at least for some group with a different arrangement of psychological
dispositions, inherited norms etc. His social self-governance model of deserving
blame is inspired by Christopher Bennett and has two aspects: (1) the expressive
aspect which means that blame expresses our dissatisfaction with what the agent
has done with his quality of will and (2) the communicative aspect of intending to
tell our dissatisfaction or conviction that they rejected our shared norms of conduct
to the agent. Vargas writes further in the book that communication could be costly
and that it is not guaranteed at all that blame will be communicated. To sum this up,
Vargas claims that blame is ordinarily deserved because, in creatures like us, blame
plays a crucial role in our ability to self-regulate. Without blame, guilt cannot
benefit the wrongdoer41.
2.1.3 Responsible agency defined
In moral practice, moral judgements seem to be at least three different judgments in
one: We judge the agent morally responsible, we judge the action morally wrong (or
right), and we judge the agent responsible for the particular (wrong or right) action.
All three judgments can have some conditions and philosophers have their own
models of what plays a role and into which variables it breaks down. In general, all
of them assume some kind of mental capacity as a condition for agents being
morally responsible at all. It could be broken down into age, education, cognitive
abilities etc. Dealing with actions is a task for moral theories and the conditions for
an action being wrong usually include doing harm to others. What is important for
41 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 263
40Vargas, Building Better Beings
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my pursuit of manipulated agents is the question of judging an agent responsible for
the specific action. It also has its own set of conditions usually including something
as a control or free will condition and an epistemic knowledge about the matter
either as a part of that control condition or as a separate condition. Those three
judgements together will render the agent morally responsible for the action.
Mr Balda, our Czech terrorist out of fear of terrorism, is an example of mentally
healthy human who probably had the overall mental capacity to understand the
matter. He was certainly not under coercion and was not temporarilly psychologicaly
incapacitated. The question is if he really had suitable epistemic knowledge to
understand the magnitude and severity of the threat he was actually trying to fight
against. In my understanding, he certainly lacked some kind of control. Instead of
being served and informed suitably, he was probably a victim of targeted marketing,
selected information and misinformative chain emails. I would consider him morally
responsible but deserving regrets rather than blame.
However in Vargas’ eyes, the output of those three judgments is the desert itself. As
I wrote, it is not the desert in Pereboom’s basic desert sense, he wants to understand
it only as a “needed social reaction”.  He calls the schema agentic moral desert and
thinks of it as construed of a three-part relation between a person, the desert basis
(or the things in virtue of which one is deserving), and the thing deserved42. The
difference between my picture and his is only that his “thing deserved” scales only
from blame to praise, but I think that it could be whatever feedback or reaction
could support moral agency. Vargas’ thoughts about the topic are based on
Strawson’s and Strawson defines moral responsibility as “to be the proper object of
the reactive attitudes, such as respect, praise, forgiveness, blame, indignation, and
the like.43” Strawson is known for treating moral judgments as emotional reactions
and this is also a significant factor in making Vargas judge manipulated agents
43 Peter Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962), p. 1-25
42 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 250
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responsible. For me, the part “to be a proper object of” matters and I would like to
imagine my emotional reaction to wrongdoing more as the detection of “a proper
object” itself and then choose a more appropriate reaction than the emotional one.
If moral responsibility attribution is an interpersonal practice keeping society a
good, stable, cooperative place, how exactly does it work? This is the answer of
Manuel Vargas:
“When we hold one another responsible, we participate in a system of
practices, attitudes, and judgments that support a special kind of
self-governance, one whereby we recognize and suitably respond to moral
considerations.44”
It could be interpreted as a self-managing system where all of us are teachers of
self-governance, judges and subjects of the judgments at the same time. However, it
should be noted that Vargas’ statement that blame and praise make sense to us
because of its effects in society45 is a bit of a controversial forward-looking definition
and others perceive it differently.
2.1.4 Attributability or accountability
Vargas’ approach goes beyond the familiar concept of accountability, usually treated
as retrospective. It makes it possible for him to hold even manipulated agents
accountable in most of the cases. Mele and others would not judge agents because it
would be beneficial to do so.
Frankfurt also thinks that manipulated agents could be morally responsible, but
from different reasons. He holds that an act is still attributable to an agent if they
45 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 5
44 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 3
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were manipulated to issue it from their real self. This is because the aim of Real Self
accounts is to determine whether behavior is attributable to an agent as opposed to
the question whether to hold the agent accountable for it46. Gary Watson points out
that since the focus is different, the important factors and even conditions for
attributability and accountability may differ. Real Self accounts have in their centre
reasons and desires and claim that only those issued from our real self are
something we are morally responsible for. In this sense, accountability is broader,
because its point of view is more interhuman and we are accountable even for events
we chose with no strong opinion.
Both attributability and accountability are important for moral responsibility. While
accountability solves the particular cases of wrongdoing, for attributability a
particular bad deed is merely a data point telling us to check the character of the
agent. If the agent was just trying, learning something or they apologize and it is
clear that they in general know what is bad about the behavior, there is no need for
intervention or other concern, because the character seems to not be too dangerous
to live in society.
Frankfurt is afraid of more serious failure modes than something which could be
obtained in a single wrongdoing. His concern is about character that could be
constituted by convictions such as harming others being a privilege of the strong or
that a certain groups of people do not deserve respect. If we reconstruct the
question he is asking it could be said as “Does this agent need to be re-educated?”.
And it goes deeper than Vargas’ system of quick feedback, where we merely ask if it
would be beneficial to blame a particular agent for a particular action.
2.1.5 Attribution of moral responsibility and analogical data problem
46 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/#AttrVersAcco, last access: 1.8.2021
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It could be also helpful to make it clearer what our attribution models on moral
responsibility are. By attribution I mean assignment of the event to its causes, i.e. to
the agents in the causal chain leading to it, this time from merely a statistical causal
point of view. In reality, there are usually multiple agents in the causal chain leading
to a bad outcome. While blaming the manufacturer and distributor of the knife
seems unreasonable, I would not say so in the case of people who helped make us
believe that it is ok to use the knife against other people. In Data Science, there are
several attribution models helping us to choose what to count as a cause of an event
(See figure X). The most common model was the one which looked only at the last
item.
Figure 1 - Attribution models
Different models are suitable for different analyses and it is the same with moral
responsibility. If we judge a child, there is an agreement that all the blame goes to
the parent (first interaction gets all). If we judge an adult, they, usually, as the final
agent in the chain who did the dirty work, get all the blame. But in more serious
situations, the blame is distributed accordingly throughout the whole gang (and
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probably also the sentenced years). We tend to put all the pressure and blame on the
performing agents themselves, because it is the easiest way for an average
participant in a moral agency practice. We can see the performing agent without any
investigation. Finding out who could have influenced the agent may be a futile effort
which can result only in having conflicting claims. But in today's world when most of
the communication happens online, we can have better data and prove what kind of
communication and advertisements play the biggest role in influencing agents to
commit offenses against other people. Then we can improve our moral practice. Not
only by stopping the worst kind of influence, because we will know how many people
will die on average if a person with half a million followers tweets something
encouraging violent behavior. We can also move our attention and blameworthiness
a bit from the manipulated agents at the end of the causal chain to the
manipulators. If they play the game of numbers by spreading information to so
many people that someone will act on it, society can do it as well. Manipulators are
unscrupulously using social networks to spread dangerous informations to create in
people the need for the products they offer (for example, for almost two-thirds of
anti-vaccine content circulating on social media platforms is the responsibility of
just twelve people, some of them owning businesses selling vitamins and alternative
medicine47), but the actual deaths could be traced back to them and even if they are
responsible for one thousandth of the particular bad outcome, it can make whole
numbers again in the sum - we can count the number of people they killed indirectly
but fully with such influence. And there are many other cases in politics and
business48.
The moral practice is often about judging the agent in front of us morally
responsible or not. But social networks change the game, because we can give
48 The business models of betting applications and addictively designed (hazard) games are already
known to be targeting the 4% of people in the population who have strong predisposition for
addiction and will spend all their money in the app.
47 https://www.counterhate.com/disinformationdozen, last access: 6.8.2021
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feedback to anyone. We do not have to ask only “Is the manipulated agent
responsible?”, we can ask “Who are all the other agents supporting his decision and
how much are they responsible?”. As both Frankfurt and Vargas noted, there can be
more than one agent responsible for one bad outcome49. In addition, the same way
the static models (which count only the easiest attribution) are being replaced in
businesses by data-driven models, moral responsibility could also be determined
based on the actual data and go beyond our intermediate reactions.
2.2 Conditions
I will now skip from attribution to the main factor or a complex of main factors
playing a role in judging agents morally responsible: structural conditions. Maybe
they are not mere factors, some philosophers consider them being the demarcation
criterion itself. This is the case of Frankfurt. Vargas thinks, as I mentioned at the
beginning of the chapter, that there is no way to find one simple criterion to
separate morally responsible agents from those not responsible (or blameworthy).
However, he tries to construct a system of structural conditions, a model of
responsible agency, which is supposed to be flexible enough to work across
situations. Mele, on the other hand, takes the view that structural conditions should
be accompanied by external conditions which exclude manipulation from cases
where moral responsibility applies. This negative condition (such as not having
manipulation on out history) for moral responsibility will be discussed in the second
part of the next chapter.
2.2.1 The epistemic and the control condition
49 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 291; originally Frankfurt:”an agent can be fully responsible
without being solely responsible” -  Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 25 n. 10.
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The freedom condition, the most common structural condition for moral
responsibility, was usually acknowledged as individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for moral responsibility together with an epistemic condition. Epistemic
condition is in different accounts called by different names: knowledge, cognitive, or
mental condition. There is also no consensus if these two conditions are distinct
because we may consider the epistemic condition being a part of the control
condition. The epistemic condition is a general cognitive state which requires that
we are aware of things we are doing on many levels, including foreseeing
consequences of the action50.
Vargas calls it self-directed agency a defines it as “in self-directed (but not yet
responsible) agency are such things as beliefs, desires, means–end reasoning, the
ability to formulate and execute action plans, and the presence of ordinary
epistemic abilities, including a general capacity for some degree of foresight
regarding the consequences of actions51”
He also includes other epistemic components into the control condition. Mele on
the other hand wrote a critical article where he asked Fischer and Ravizza what
epistemic requirements for being morally responsible for performing an action A are
not also requirements for freely performing A52. Mele’s answer is that there are no
such self-standing epistemic conditions. Regardless of whether the epistemic
condition is completely a part of a freedom/control condition or if we distinguish the
epistemic condition for agency in general (like a nonmoral action of choosing an ice
cream flavor) and the epistemic condition specific for moral agency (such as
choosing a way to get some money), there are definitely some partial skills an agent
can lack without missing the condition completely. It is also certain that some kinds
of manipulation consist of manipulating the epistemic part alone. How it will affect
52 Alfred Mele, “Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions”, Philosophical
Explorations, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2010), p. 101–111, DOI: 10.1080/13869790903494556
51 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 201
50 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/, last access: 6.8.2021
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the resulting responsibility will be discussed in the next chapter and I will now focus
on the control condition itself.
Frankfurt presented several definitions appealing to a good integration into an
agent’s psychical condition, wholeheartedness or the unity of first- and
second-order desires. All of them appeal to some kind of unity or authenticity in the
agent and because of it they are classified as Real Self accounts. According to them,
an agent is morally responsible if the behavior is attributable to their real (or deep)
self.
The definitions are as follows:
1. Identification with the springs of the action
“To the extent that a person identifies himself with the springs of his actions,
he takes responsibility for those actions and acquires moral responsibility for
them; moreover, the questions of how the actions and his identifications with
their springs are caused are irrelevant to the questions of whether he
performs the actions freely or is morally responsible for performing them.53”
2. Wholeheartedness
“If someone does something because he wants to do it, and if he has no
reservations about that desire but is wholeheartedly behind it, then—so far as
his moral responsibility for doing it is concerned—it really does not matter
how he got that way. One further requirement must be added: . . . the
person’s desires and attitudes have to be relatively well integrated into his
general psychic condition. Otherwise they are not genuinely his . . . . As long
as their interrelations imply that they are unequivocally attributable to him . .
53 Harry Frankfurt. “The Importance of What We Care About”, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 1988.), p. 54
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. it makes no difference—so far as evaluating his moral responsibility is
concerned—how he came to have them.54”
3. United first-order and second-order desires
“[Humans] are able to form what I shall call "second-order desires" [...]
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may
also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are
capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from
what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call
"first-order desires" [...] which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing
or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity
for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of
second-order desires.55”
“The unwilling addict has conflicting first-order desires: he wants to take the
drug, and he also wants to refrain from taking it. In addition to these
first-order desires, however, he has a volition of the second order. He is not
neutral with regard to the conflict between his desire to take the drug and his
desire to refrain from taking it. It is the latter desire, and not the former, that
he wants to constitute his will. […]
The other addict is a wanton. His actions reflect the economy of his
first-order desires, without this being concerned whether the desires that
move him to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to act. If he
encounters problems in obtaining the drug or in administering it to himself,
his responses to his urges to take it may involve deliberation. But it never
55 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971),
page 6-7
54 Harry Frankfurt. “Reply to John Martin Fischer.” In S. Buss and L. Overton,
eds. Contours of Agency. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2002.), 27–31. p. 27
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occurs to him to consider whether he wants the relations among his desires to
result in his having the will he has.56”
The last definition is called hierarchical. It is based on an appropriate reflection
procedure which makes agent’s motives, choices, or values authentically their own57.
Both Vargas and Mele object to these conditions that our inner alignment or an
active choice in accordance with our real self is not the only case where we are
morally responsible. That is because they understand moral responsibility as
accountability and we are accountable even for the actions that do not fully
represent our inner character. For accountability, it does not matter if we had doubts
and our real self is not (yet) a proper murderer. But it is ok, conditions for
accountability and attributability may differ.
We can at least say that Frankfurt’s conditions successfully exclude coerced agents
from being morally responsible. You are definitely not wholeheartedly behind
something you are coerced to do. However, there is still a broad spectrum of
situations where an agent could be manipulated and still acting from his real self.
2.1.2 The capacity for moral responsibility
Holding agents morally responsible assumes some capacities or agential structures
that enable the agent to even understand that he is held responsible and what it
means.
Vargas criticizes Frankfurt’s account in this regard. According to him, Frankfurt
claims that there is the capacity for reflective self-evaluation required before one can
have second-order desires.
Vargas sees no reason not to understand that (comparatively unusual) distinctive
capacity as the locus of freedom. The reason for that is that the source of these
57 Hutchison et al.,Social dimensions of moral responsibility, p. 11
56 ibid., page 12
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higher-order desires’ relevance is exactly the fact that they are products of reflective
self-evaluation. It would not support the distinction Frankfurt made if they were just
a product of unmediated instinct58. But again, this seems to be a misunderstanding
based on the confusion of accountability with attributability.
It seems clear that there is a difference between adult humans and animals or
newborn children, because it makes no sense to hold the latter responsible.
However, there is no consensus on where the borders of these capacities are. The
Real Self accounts paid a lot of attention to the capacity. Susan Wolf presented a case
of JoJo, who’s real self is the product of a traumatic upbringing. She claims that while
JoJo was raised by an evil dictator, he wants to be moved by torturing, imprisoning
and other wrongdoings, but it still may be unfair to hold him responsible for his
behavior, because he does not fulfill the moral competence condition. The issue is
related to Mele’s distinction between sheddable and unsheddable values and to the
process of internalisation explained below.
At this point, we need to know that for Frankfurt the capacity for moral
responsibility in the sense of accountability is a more basic condition, distinct from
the control condition which he uses in a sense of attributability. This contrasts with
Vargas for whom the model of the capacity to recognize and respond to moral
considerations is central to accountability. Attributability is out of scope for him.
2.3 Reasons and moral motivation
Moral reasons for action as an input variable to agential reasons-responsiveness are
also an important factor for judging the agent morally responsible. One can be an
internalist or externalist about reasons59. Internalists think that one can only
59 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-internal-external/, last access: 14.7.2021
58 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 145
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respond to reasons if they have them properly internalized. Maybe the dictator’s son
JoJo can respond to moral considerations in general, but he never noticed that
causing pain to others could be morally wrong. According to externalists about
reasons, the reasons exist in society and it is not possible not to encounter them. An
agent is expected to follow moral reasons even though they never internalized them.
This neighbouring philosophical problem is deep but also important for our
judgments about moral responsibility of manipulated agents, because some kinds of
manipulation are based exactly on disrupting the process of internalization. It is the
part of the debate where there are the biggest terminological inconsistencies. Most
of the philosophers abandoned the term reasons, because it is already very
philosophically burdened and established their own terminology for discussing
moral motivation.
Vargas prefers the term moral considerations because reason is conceived of as
something like an autonomous faculty that properly operates independently of the
effects of moral affect60, at least in the rationalist conception of agency61. This seems
to imply he wants to focus on internal motivation only.
Vargas explains that internalised moral reasons are a product of sustained exposure
to external reasons for compliance62. Our reactive attitudes “initially work by
providing external motivation for agents to track moral considerations and regulate
their behavior in light of them”, but under many conditions, we will obey the
external motivation and it will eventually become a norm that is experienced as
intrinsically motivating63. After this short explanation, Vargas stops using the
63 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 175
62 Harland, Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? p. 408
61 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 203
60 He is also following the Strawsonian view in understanding moral judgements as something based
on emotions. I believe that emotional resentment is a result of learning to recognize evil and it is not
very important for my cause, how we experience it.
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language of intrinsic motivation, but based on that Harland suggests interpreting
Vargas’ following concept of responsiveness to moral considerations as:
“A person is responsive to some moral consideration M to the extent that he is
intrinsically motivated to act in accordance with M.”64.
Mele does not stay with the notion of reason either. He calls moral reasons regularly
desires, which seems to be an incorrect use of psychological terminology. He
explains in his book Motivation and Agency:
“Philosophical work on reasons for action tends to be guided by concerns with two
distinct but related topics: the explanation of intentional actions and the evaluation
of intentional actions or their agents. In work dominated by the explanatory concern,
reasons for action tend to be understood as states of mind. Philosophers concerned
primarily with evaluation may be sympathetic or unsympathetic to this construal,
depending on their views about standards for evaluating actions or agents. [...] A
theorist who holds that the pertinent notion of rationality is subjective [...] may be
happy to understand reasons for action as states of mind [...]. A theorist with a more
objective conception of rational action [...] may find it very natural to insist that
many or all reasons for action are facts about the agent-external world.65”
It could mean that he acknowledges that there is a disagreement about the
externalist or internalist nature of reasons in moral theories regarding their
evaluative concern. His goal, in contrast, is to explain what motivates human
behavior and he does not want to use the term reasons for it, because of its possible
externalistic interpretation. He wants to discuss the internalized motivation only
and to not confuse his readers. This interpretation is also supported by Clarke, who
mentions that for Mele, the label desire, even for something an agent does not value,
65 Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency
64 Harland, Beyond the Moral Influence Theory?, p. 408
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gives us a thin and subjective notion of rationality and reasonableness66. Mele is
(according to Clarke) willing to allow that an agent may have reasons that are
external, however, he suggests that they can contribute to explanations of actions
only by way of the agent’s recognizing them and acquiring the sorts of attitudes that
causalist action theorists call reasons.
Mele also introduces an umbrella term for desires and non-desires called
motivation-encompassing attitudes. They are supposed to be desires to A, intentions
to A, beliefs that we ought to A, and beliefs that we will A67. In his later books,
including Manipulated Agents, he calls them simply pro-attitudes.
In the next chapter, I would like to analyze in more detail the control conditions and
the historical condition. I will describe different modes in which manipulated agents
may fail to have control and I will introduce Perebooms’s famous Four Case
Argument, which captures most of the failure modes. I consider manipulation a
special case of a failure and I believe that if we could see it in a context of different
failures, it may reveal some inconsistencies that philosophers commit while
unsystematically taking into account some factors and not others.
3. The control condition
Control could mean several things depending on the model of decision making we
have. We can find ourselves in a designed situation, we can get manipulated
information, or we can be a specific target of global manipulation, such as those in
manipulation cases.
67 Mele, Motivation and Agency, p. 19
66 Randolph Clarke, “Motivation and Agency  by Alfred R. Mele”, Mind 113 (2004), p. 565-569
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Obviously, if we get false information, our control structures are not replaced, but
manipulators are giving us the manipulated information at moments when the
probabilities that we will check its correctness are low. It means that although we
are a fully responsible adult, there are only a few chances we can get out of the
situation. Still, we can say that it is our responsibility to know that these kinds of
fraudsters exist and that they use a specific, clever trick or a lie to make us do
something unethical.
I have already described that control means in Real Self accounts something like
harmony or inner alignment. The focus is on the degree to which our choice of
action is well integrated with the rest of our motivations, so we do not have any
opposing tendencies. The next step is to show what Vargas' account has to offer.
3.1 The model of responsible agency & Vargas
For Vargas, the question of the epistemic condition being (or not being) a part of the
control condition described in the chapter 2.1.1 should be answered by having two
distinct epistemic requirements. One is the foresight condition which is more
general and is considered a part of the self-directed agency condition (although
Vargas mentions that foreseeability of the effects of an action could be also drawn as
an independent third item in the figure besides self-directed agency and free will).
The other epistemic requirement is recognitional capacity. It is a more particular,
free-will specific requirement of recognizing epistemic moral considerations. If we
are Mr. Balda, we can have a general epistemic knowledge about religious wars and
consequences of being a neighbour to someone with different religious customs. We
can be right that increased attention to the topic can help people to take a more
protective stance to their customs, but we can miss the particular moral
consideration that achieving this by cutting down the tree on the tracks is a crime
and it threatens the lives of our fellow citizens.
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To treat foreseeability as separate from the free will condition seems to be useful
also from the perspective of failure modes. If we fail to consider some particular
consequence that means nothing morally, it could be exculpated, but failing to
recognize moral considerations for the same action is the main reason for blame. Of
course, in reality it is connected: Only if we can foresee events in general, can we,
probably, recognize their moral significance. But if we did not see them coming, we
can still claim that it was only a case of ignorance and we would have definitely
considered the moral side of it if we ever knew. For example, if we lacked epistemic
knowledge that someone's foot was nearby and had no reason to think it might be, it
is not a matter of ill will, or a failure of due concern by us in light of morality, when
we accidentally step on someone’s foot68. We also may know that it is probable that
someone’s foot is there (have foresight) and fail to recognize it as a moral reason not
to step there (recognitional capacity).
Vargas thinks that we can also satisfy the moral epistemic condition without having
reasonable foresight. He claims that “in a particular situation, one might have a
good grasp of the salient moral considerations that ought to play a role in one’s
deliberation, but all the same, one might have little grasp of the likely consequences
of choosing one way rather than another.69” I do not think it is sufficient, because
this kind of explanation offers only potential recognition. Someone can recognize
relevant moral aspects because we saw them in other relevant situations, where they
also foresaw the consequences, acting morally. Another situation could be that we
know that they can recognize moral considerations theoretically, because they talk
about it. However, we need a recognitional capacity that actually recognizes relevant
situations where moral considerations apply (or could apply), to really act on it. The
research of Keith Stanovich shows that it could be way more complicated with the
epistemic part of the control condition. His book What Intelligence Tests Miss: The
Psychology of Rational Thought overflows with examples of people who have excellent
69 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p.202
68 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 234
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thinking skills (potentially) but they perform very poorly in recognizing the
situations where they should apply them. He calls them cognitive misers and they
could be a significant part of the population. It could be problematic for Vargas and I
will go back to it in the context of failure modes later in this chapter.
Figure 2 - Vargas’ account
The figure above shows Vargas’ model of responsible agency. He thinks of his
account as a prescriptive one which requires some construction, i.e. idealization that
is normatively structured70, but does not postulate any entities that are at odds with
a broadly naturalistic view71. Harland thinks of it as a two-part test for responsible
agency72, because the whole model consisting of conditions (A and (B) is a capacity
sufficient (but not necessary, because we can also have indirect responsibility) for
responsible agency. Vargas provides the following description:
“An agent S is a responsible agent with respect to considerations of type M in
circumstances C if S possesses a suite of basic agential capacities implicated in
72 Harland, Beyond the Moral Influence Theory?, p. 417
71 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 216
70 Normatively structured idealization in a sense that he does not want to describe the current moral
practice, he wants to set the norms that should be followed in order to cultivate moral agency. But
not that idealistic, so it departs from the naturalistic picture of the world.
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effective self-directed agency (including, for example, beliefs, desires, intentions,
instrumental reasoning, and generally reliable beliefs about the world and the
consequences of action) and is also possessed of the relevant capacity for (A)
detection of suitable moral considerations M in C and (B) self-governance with
respect to M in C.73”
Condition A (the control condition, free will) is constituted by two distinct
capacities: recognitional and volitional. Recognitional capacity specifies a detection
condition for the control (or free will) and for Vargas it is as follows:
“(A) the capacity for detection of the relevant moral considerations obtains when:
(i) S actually detects moral consideration of type M in C that are pertinent to
actions
available to S or
(ii) in those possible worlds where S is in a context relevantly similar to C,
and
moral considerations of type M are present in those contexts, in a suitable
proportion of those worlds S successfully detects those considerations.”
The position is highly variable. It does not suppose that there is something like a
physically stable realizer and allows that what counts as responsible agency can vary
considerably across contexts even for the same agent with no intrinsic change in
that agent. Vargas also points out that the detection does not need to be conscious
and that the mechanism of this awareness is likely to be diverse and even variably
constituted at neurological levels.
Volitional capacity
73 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 214-215
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The second condition (B) called self-governance or volitional control condition on
responsible agency is supposed to be a more basic requirement which is not tied to
responsibility specifically, but its distinctive part needed for responsible agency
could be characterized as follows:
“(B) the capacity for volitional control, or self- governance with respect to the
relevant moral considerations (M) in circumstances (C) obtains when either
(i) S is, in light of awareness of M in C, motivated to accordingly pursue
courses of action for which M counts in favor, and to avoid courses of action
disfavored by M or
(ii) when S is not so motivated, in a suitable proportion of those worlds
where S is in a context relevantly similar to C
(a) S detects moral considerations of type M, and
(b) in virtue of detecting M considerations, S acquires the motivation
to act
accordingly, and
(c) S successfully acts accordingly.”
To explain the relevant similarity in his definition of detection capacity, he gives an
example: If we suppose the relevant similarity is very coarse-grained, i.e. the bare
fact that the context is actional or deliberative makes it the same context, it makes
the relevance too expansive and it would not allow us to distinguish between
contexts where an agent is trying hard to ascertain the moral considerations and
“contexts where, say, an agent was non-culpably extraordinarily time-pressured or
subject to manipulation74”. It would almost always render agents capable of
detecting moral considerations and become very demanding.
On the other hand, if the relevance is too fine-grained in a deterministic world,
similar would mean exactly identical and then we will have a very permissive
74 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 218
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conception (where we cannot effectively blame anyone). This leaves us with a
moderate degree of granularity of a non-subjective conception of relevance which
Vargas describes as being co-optimal or better for fostering agency that recognizes
and suitably responds to moral considerations.
Vargas explains that limit cases such as Frankfurt cases and alike are likely to create
their own idiosyncratic classes of relevant similarity, i.e., Frankfurt cases contexts
might have their own rules about what counts as a capacity, quite apart from more
ordinary contexts75.
The notion of a suitable proportion of worlds in his formula is explained as co-optimal
for a practicable system of judgments, practices, and attitudes shaped by the aims of
the responsibility system. However, Vargas agrees that our agency is not ideal and
we also never have certainty that all the conditions are met.
He also opposes the Real Self views by mentioning: “What does matter is that it is a
moral consideration that moves the agent to act either actually, or in the suitable
range of counterfactuals. How and whether we judge the springs of our own action is
less important than what in fact moves us to act.76” He adds that the agent is
responsible even if we discover that they misrepresented their motivations to
themselves.
Two parts of this model are possibly problematic for me. First, the word relevance is
a keystone of the definition. All the pressure is on the fact if we count a world where
an agent responded to M as relevantly similar. The coarse-grained/fine-grained
specification does not give us enough clues for where to lead the line. Second,
Vargas explicitly refers to the ideal observer with his non-subjective conception of
relevance. He writes that “the notions of suitability and relevant similarity invoked
in (A.ii) and (B.ii) are given by the standards an ideal, fully informed, rational,
observer in the actual world would select as at least co-optimal for the cultivation of
76 217
75 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 220
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our moral considerations-responsive agency77”. These two references are not very
illuminating and they leave us with a vague model of responsible agency.
3.2 Circumstantialism
In some respects, the vagueness of the agential model could be also understood as
its strength. Whether one is self-governed in one or another context partly depends
on whether or not the detection condition has been satisfied. This is an important
connection making self-governance tied to particulars, i.e. specific situations with
specific moral considerations. Vargas claims to be skeptical of there being a single,
unified thing that constitutes control across all circumstances, both internal and
external to the context of responsibility78. For him, responsible agency is a function
of the agent and their circumstances, and therefore is highly context sensitive. The
general capacity of reasons-responsiveness is meant to be really a cluster of more
specific, ecologically limited capacities indexed to particular circumstances79 and the
emerging picture of agency in the social, cognitive, and neurosciences supports this
view.
Vargas’ circumstantialist picture is one in which an agent’s control can vary across
context and relatively to the involved moral concern with no variation in intrinsic
features of the agent80. It contrasts with most of the other accounts of responsible
agency, including Frankfurt’s, which present one fixed intrinsic feature as the
general capacity for general responsible agency and therefore cannot explain
variances in capacities of the agents.
In those accounts it is not possible to fail to detect a given class of moral
consideration and be nevertheless able to self-govern in light of moral
80 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 226
79 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 205
78 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 223
77 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 214
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considerations of another type. If we are bad at detecting considerations of
kindness, it does not influence our considerations of loyalty and we can self-govern
in circumstances where only loyalty considerations are needed. Or another Vargas’
example: “My ability to resist the impulse to make rude remarks to students and
strangers need not mean that I am resistant to such impulses when with family
members over the holidays.81”
Vargas describes other accounts as having the atomistic tendency: responsibility’s
requirements are understood in a way that focuses exclusively on the agent. He
criticizes that it takes responsible agency as a set of properties of an agent in a
vacuum and argues that self-governance or self-control should be conceived as
notions from social psychology.
His responsible agency model is claimed not to be a cross-situationally stable
mechanism, because it seems unlikely to him that we have any such thing.
3.3 Failure modes of the model of responsible agency
To summarize it, I would like to go through the options of how we can fail to be
responsible according to Vargas’ agential model. Vargas is distinguishing two kinds
of exculpation: excusation and exemption. We can be excused based on our
ignorance in cases where the harm was unintentional (see the example with
stepping on someone’s foot above). Some agents are, however, exempted from
responsibility even before they perform an action, because their reason-responsive
structures are impaired.
Exemptions
81 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 225
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Vargas provides a few examples of exemptions where he does not specify which part
of the responsible agency was impaired, but it seems that both epistemic conditions
(foresight and recognition of moral considerations) for reason-responsiveness are
impaired. One example is a soldier who suffered a head injury and is not able to
recognize reasons. If he is commanded to kill prisoners, he is thanks to his
predisposition exempted from being held responsible82.
The important thing to note is that Vargas considers indirect responsibility being a
valid part of social practice. It means that there could be cases in which we are not
currently reason-responsive, but at the time we chose the actual course of action we
were reason-responsive. We can imagine that the soldier was a healthy,
reason-responsive human at the time he received the order to kill the prisoners and
he decided to get drunk so “that he becomes numb to moral considerations
generally.83” Another example are so-called tracing84 cases featuring drunk driving.
According to Vargas, we are morally responsible in these kinds of situations.
The locus of failure
Those could be examples of an impairment of the reason-responsive capacity in
general, but Vargas thinks that agents might be responsible in some circumstances,
owing to their possession of the appropriate sensitivity and responsiveness to some
minor moral consideration, but not in other circumstances. Example of this could be
the mentioned case of responsibility to loyalty without responsibility to kindness.
84 Tracing means that their moral responsibility traces back to the time when they were sober and did
the decision to drink.
83 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 272
82 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 272
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The problem with the sensitivity to certain classes of moral considerations is that
Vargas claims that we do not count as responsible only if we have a complete lack
of sensitivity. It implies sensitivity to particular moral considerations as a scale,
which seems to be an upgrade in comparison to other accounts where the detection
capacity or the whole capacity for moral agency is treated as a binary term. It is a
sad thing to construct a very flexible account model of a morally responsible agency
and still being unable to assign blame relatively to the advancement of the
capacities. However, it could be also interpreted that being morally responsible
means at least some moral responsibility. In that case it makes sense that only a
complete inability to detect moral considerations exempt agents from moral
responsibility and it also explains why Vargas judges most of the manipulated
agents responsible.
Besides content- and circumstance-specific failures of recognitional capacity for
moral considerations, there could be a failure of a specific part of the agential
model. Vargas provides an example of a failure mode where an agent fails to be
governed in light of M. In case of failure situated in the volitional capacity, the agent
recognizes the moral consideration, but it has no proper connection to the
production of the action and that means that B(i) is not fulfilled. Consider Diego
who has a habit of providing bandages to strangers. He does not do it to help others,
it is his ritual executed every Tuesday at noon. Diego recognizes that a particular
tourist needs a bandage, but he gives it to them because it is Tuesday, not because
they need it. There is a need for a connection of content between the moral
consideration and the course of action and it is not present in Diego’s case85. The
problem with the case might be that if Diego is not praiseworthy for his deed, he
would not be blameworthy for the same reasons if he was ritually punching tourists
in their heads (without ill will and without connection to the right moral
85 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 224
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consideration). It does not seem right, but Vargas can object that those are folk
intuitions which should be replaced by his normative model.
A case of partial exemption could also be acquired psychopathy. Vargas also claims
that acquired psychopathy as a result of manipulation is a valid excuse from moral
responsibility86. Harland notes that this is inconsistent with his prospective account
of blameworthiness and the process of internalization: “Even if psychopaths lack
moral sentiments, many are able to adjust their conduct in light of prudential
concerns. It seems plausible to think that repeated exposure to negative stimuli (e.g.
blame) could give at least some psychopaths an affective drive not to engage in
wrongful conduct. According to ACM [Vargas’ agential cultivation model], this
should make them moral agents.”
These failure modes may seem sufficient to determine moral responsibility in the
manipulation cases, yet Vargas did not see any of his failure modes as suitable to
accommodate manipulation. It will be shown on the Four-case argument.
3.4 Character control & Mele
As opposed to Vargas, who is using the word “control” in a specific sense of being
able to respond to morally relevant considerations and self-govern in light of them, Mele
writes in his book Manipulated Agents about control in a more self-constituting
sense. For him, control is a behavioral practice during which we govern ourselves to
grow into a person we want to be - as opposed to our childhood, when we are
“inevitably fashioned and sustained, after all, by circumstances over which we have
no control”87. Characters from his examples (Sally and Chuck introduced in the next
chapter) are depicted as adults with their own active role in their self-development.
87 Mele, Manipulated Agents, p. 92
86 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 278
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As Mele writes, it is relevant for moral responsibility when agents’ capacities for
control over their mental lives are being bypassed88, which is what is happening in
manipulation cases.
This is Mele’s set of examples of exercising capacities for control over one’s mental
life and one’s consequent character:
“Sometimes we are told that, or wonder whether, we care too much—or too
little—about our work, what others think of us, our children’s success, how we
dress, money, our health, or whatever. Sometimes, on reflection, we judge
that we should care less—or more—about some of these things. Occasionally
we make efforts to get ourselves to care less—or more. Someone who becomes
convinced that he cares way too little about his health may try to get himself
to care much more by spending time each day picturing opportunities that
would be closed to him by poor health and thinking about the ways in which
better health would improve his life, someone who judges that he cares way
too much about work may attempt to fix that by reflecting periodically on the
good things that his work leaves him little time for, and so on. Sometimes
such efforts are successful, and no such effort would succeed if the values at
issue were unsheddable (at the time). [Values that] are revisable in this way . .
. differ from unsheddable values that some workaholics, misers, and health
fanatics may have. How, exactly, the distinction is spelled out by a particular
compatibilist depends on that theorist’s preferred way of understanding what
it is to have been able, in deterministic worlds, to do things that one did not
do. I leave that open89.”
I mentioned bypassing our control by skewing our detection capacity to be
insensitive in particular situations but this is another kind of bypassing. If we want
89 Mele, Free Will and Luck, p. 186
88 Mele, Manipulated Agents, p. 45
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to manipulate an agent to act against their unshedable values which constitute their
character, we need to manipulate them in a more extensive way. Mele shows in cases
called Radical reversals that if an agent worked hard on their character to become a
nice person, and it was reverted forcefully by some kind of (neurosurgical)
intervention, it is a good reason to exclude them from moral responsibility.
This means a more serious threat to Real Self accounts, namely to Frankfurt's
structural condition for being morally responsible. There could be some kind of
disharmony in agents who were manipulated to be insensitive to moral
considerations, in particular situations in which they are not in other relevant
situations. This asymmetrical sensitivity cannot count as wholeheartedness and it
will exclude them from responsible agency. But if their whole character was
manipulated there could be a case where an agent has no reservations to his act and
we cannot tell from his internal structure that he was manipulated to be as he is.
So far, I have introduced three approaches to the control or free will condition,
which is the crucial one for moral responsibility. (1) Frankfurt’s structural conditions
in his Real Self account, (2) Vargas’ model of responsible agency were already
discussed. (3) Mele’s historicist approach based on a negative condition will be
discussed in chapter 4. I also mentioned some factors that can play a role in judging
the agents responsible and some failure modes in which we can do the wrong thing.
This could be explained further in Pereboom’s famous Four-case manipulation
argument.
3.5 The Four-case argument
Pereboom’s Four-case manipulation argument is great for detailed analysis, because it
is well commented on by various philosophers who revealed their intuitions about it
and it shows many possible failure modes to analyze. The four parts of the
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argument90 describe four stories featuring Mr. Plum, an egoistic person in a
deterministic universe, who decides to kill Mr. White. The assumption is that Plum
is causally determined to do that by different versions of the circumstances of his
life. We also suppose that he would not do it without the circumstances described.
All the cases mention that his behavior matches his often selfish character and that
he does not act out of an irresistible desire, but his decision results from a
reason-responsive process of deliberation.
It goes as follows:
1. Plum is manipulated by evil neurosurgeons to kill White. He is an egoistic
person, but usually succeeds in regulating himself. In this situation, the
neurosurgeons were manipulating him by radio-like technology, specifically
by pressing the button just before he started to reason about his situation.
2. Evil neurosurgeons manipulated Plum at the beginning of his life to make his
reasoning often egoistic. In his situation, given his programmed egoistic
reasons, he decides to kill White.
3. Plum grew up in a community which trained him so that his deliberative
reasoning is often egoistic. His acquired tendency to engage in egoistic
reason-responsive processes leads him to kill White.
4. Plum was raised in a normal family and because of his developed egoistic
tendency in the deliberation process, he kills White91.
The pressure is to draw the line between responsibility and non-responsibility and
make the distinction a principled one. According to Pereboom, Plum is not different
in the four cases in any way relevant for responsibility. All the Plums are like a
normal agent in normal circumstances: causally determined. The circumstances of
91 ibid., p. 76-79
90 Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
ISBN 978-0-19-877686-4. p. 77
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how Plum was determined to kill do not matter. If we think that Case 1 is not a case
of responsibility, we should think that about all the cases92.
In the description of the cases, Pereboom makes sure he describes Plum meeting
most of the possible conditions for  free responsible agency described by Real Self
accounts (and other accounts which bothered to define an internal condition for
moral responsibility): Plum’s first order desire conforms to his second order desire.
That means he does not have a desire not to have the desire to kill White. Also, no
irresistible desire on an emotional level which would override
reason-responsiveness plays a role. Plum decided based on his rational egoistic
reasoning as he normally does, just this time, he was manipulated to pay more
attention to the egoistic reasons than he would in the same situation and it tipped
the scales resulting in another final decision. Plum’s action does not conflict with
his character, he acts often egotistically in other situations, though not always.
As Pereboom explains in his replies to objections, the argument features
manipulation just to make it intuitive that something makes an agent unfree. “The
next step is to argue that non-responsibility is preserved even when the
manipulation is subtracted, on the ground there is no responsibility-relevant
difference between the deterministic case that features manipulation and one that
does not.93”
Although the argument originally serves to show that we have no control at all, it
shows us a lot about what philosophers really mean by their accounts.
3.6 Reactions to the Four-case argument
93 Ibid. p. 80
92 Ibid.
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The argument has not been accepted by historicists or structuralists. Mele is
refusing it by claiming that causal determinism is not the best explanation for the
intuition that Plum is not responsible in Cases 1-3 as Pereboom says. “So far, at
least, the claim that the manipulation in those cases is what does the
intuition-producing work looks very plausible,94” he writes. He also provides
alternative arguments with indeterministic scenarios which have the same effect
with no determinism involved to support his thesis, but we have already ruled out
indeterminism from our playing field.
In structuralist positions, some philosophers claimed that they have no intuition
about Plum not being responsible in Cases 1-395. Compatibilist McKenna gave the
hard-line reply saying that since the normal deterministic agent is morally
responsible, so is Plum96.
Stephen Kearns objects much like Mele does that manipulation is what makes the
first cases intuitively about non-responsibility and it does not transfer to the
ordinary case97.
An interesting answer comes from Fisher98. He claims that there is a difference
between responsibility and blameworthiness as I already mentioned in the previous
chapter. Consistently with his view, he claims that there is no difference with
respect to the minimal control conditions for moral responsibility, making Plum
responsible in all the cases. The minimal control condition for him is the guidance
control I mentioned in the first chapter and is defined in terms of “action flowing
from the agent’s own, moderately reason-responsive mechanism99”. However, there
are wide disparities in the conditions for blameworthiness including the
99 John M. Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility
(Cambridge University Press, 1998).page 207
98 John M. Fischer, “Responsibility and Manipulation”, The Journal of Ethics 8, (2004), p. 158
97 Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life
96Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply To Pereboom’s Four-Case Argument”, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 77 (2008), p. 142-159
95Harry Frankfurt, “Reply to John Martin Fischer”, in: Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.) Contours of
Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, eds.. The MIT Press. 2002. 27–8
94 Mele, Free Will and Luck, p.141
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circumstances of the creation of Plum’s values, character or desires. He also says
that there is no reason to suppose that anything like such unusual circumstances
exist only as a result of causal determinism.
Vargas considers Pereboom’s Four-case argument a problem for our commonsense
conceptions of freedom and responsibility and claims that his normative account is
different.
According to him, Plum has the capacity to recognize moral considerations and is
therefore responsible even in Case 2. In Case 1, Vargas claims that details matter. If
the neuroscientists push buttons to manipulate Plum to start rationally egoistic
reasoning, they may do it by altering inputs while leaving his deliberations and
mechanisms of rejection intact. Only if the agent's reasoning capacity and
deliberation mechanisms are micro-managed and flawed, will Vargas admit that the
agent is not responsible100.
Inputs and structure
As he explains, the replaced control structures work more as an excuse for agents
than if they were able to control their actions and were subjects of manipulated
inputs only. But what does this suddenly appearing distinction mean? The only
specification Vargas provides is with desires. If we have some additional desires
(inputs) and their strength doesn’t disrupt our ability to consider others in our
behaviour, then we still have the kind of control that suffices for moral
responsibility. He adds, cynically, that if we think that we lose the ability to respond
to moral consideration and it disrupts our responsibility after receiving a new desire,
we should think the same thing about any food advertisement that makes us
hungry101. But the question is when it is disrupted and if disruptive desire counts as
replaced control. Vargas says that there could be a really strong but not irresistible
101 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 277
100 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 287
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desire, which may disrupt control, but not responsibility-relevant control. Or there
could be cases where our responsibility-relevant control will be maintained, but
other control disrupted. But it does not bring us any closer to some specific
examples of replaced control structures. I can guess that ordinarily replaced or
impaired control, where we fail to apply the right considerations, could be the case,
for example, when intoxicated. Or maybe we should interpret it that disruption of
responsibility-relevant control by a strong desire means the replacement. In any
case, it still does not help us in cases of manipulation by evil neurosurgeons, where
the control structures are in place, but our values are manipulated.
I would like to oppose the distinction between structure and input manipulation. At
least in some models of decision-making, there is not a big difference between
inputs and the control structures themselves. The repetitive inputs are just
promoted to “the position of structure”. All the models of learning based on
reinforcement rely on inputs, reinforcement of the inputs by repetition and reward.
There are also association theorists who believe that there is no structure in our
knowledge besides the one created by inputs which were commonly taken
together102. This means that it is even harder for us to distinguish between a
harmless advertisement and manipulation. The same ad could be harmless for one
agent and manipulative for another, less resilient one, who has already seen a lot of
similar ads and is about to create a destructive opinion based on it. It also means a
good thing: we are not even close to overnight manipulations, because radical
reversals need time for proper reinforcement.
The role of informations
102 What is Associationism? in Associationist Theories of Thought
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/associationist-thought/#WhaAss accessed 5.8.2021, First published
Tue Mar 17, 2015; substantive revision Wed Jun 24, 2020
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The counterfactual information that Plum would not decide to kill White without
the intervention (whatever it is across the cases) seems interesting to me. This is
something unique to theoretical scenarios. We never have this type of information
while judging real-life scenarios from our bounded point of view and so far, only
Mele and his students are considering seriously indeterministic scenarios where the
manipulation consists only of increasing chances for some specific outcome. But
what we could have is information about the externalities. Given Plum’s character,
nobody but his mom would suspect that anything extraordinary happened to make
him commit murder. However, information about the manipulation changes the
game. It shows an interesting relationship between our knowledge about
mechanisms in the world (influence, internalization, harmful social practice) and
our actual judgement about moral responsibility of the manipulated agent: Based on
the fact that we will never know how far Plum was from killing someone, we can
only deduce from what we know about other people growing up in an environment
practicing deviant social engineering to what degree their environment is
responsible for their current condition. We will actually imagine what an ideal
observer could have known based on our actual knowledge and exculpate Plum to
the degree we think the environment participated in his decision.
3.7 The roots of the disagreement
Prospective versus retrospective views
By the Four-case argument, Pereboom wants to show that moral responsibility in the
basic desert sense is in conflict with the basic deterministic rules of the physical
world. That is because the control in action required for an agent to be truly
deserving of blame and praise is a kind of control we never have. He holds that there
are other senses of moral responsibility that are plausible. In chapter 6 of his book,
he suggests a concept of blame as an interhuman practice to prevent immoral
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behavior and its consequences, i.e. a process where addressing wrongdoing is a stage
to moral formation of an agent or their (or others’) realization of a particular
objective of moral consideration103. This approach is actually similar to Vargas’
although Vargas claims that his conception is different from “pereboomian”. There
are at least two important factors which they have in common. Both are considering
moral responsibility as social practice and both are trying to redefine deserts in
forward-looking terms as I already explained in chapter 2.1.
As I mentioned, prospective interpretation of blame is a bit controversial. John
Doris104criticizes it as follows: the common understanding of desert, even supported
by Oxford English Dictionary, is backward-looking. Its retrospective function is
essential and if Vargas defines desert as a prospective term with a function to make
better people, he does not do the revision, he is stipulating a brand new term. For
Doris, it does not make sense even after Vargas’ upgrade of the concept (now Vargas
claims that it has two levels: particular judgements are backward-looking, but the
whole responsibility practice is forward-looking). Doris illustrates it in the example
of sports. According to Vargas a player should say: “We deserved to win the title,
because it will make me a better player.” But according to the theorist defending
backward-looking desert the sportsman should say: “We deserved to win the title,
because we fairly won 4 of 7 games in the final series.”
It could be easily objected that this is not the practice Vargas has in mind and the
forward-looking practice can include backward-looking blame: The sportsman may
say that “We deserve the title, because everyone saw that we are the best and it will
motivate everyone to also do their best.” But one can still notice that the
backward-looking desert is somehow closer to the notion of fairness than the
forward-looking one. Doris says that the consequence of forward-looking blame
could result in that the most incorrigible offenders would deserve the least
104 John M. Doris, “Doing without (arguing about) desert”, Philosophical Studies volume 172 (2015), p.
2625-2634
103 Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life
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punishment and it also makes it possible to punish someone if it is likely that they
would benefit from it. Does it help if retrospective and prospective practices are
situated at different levels of moral discourse and the particular judgements are
backward-looking while the whole practice is forward-looking? While we can tell
that punishing particular agents is retrospective and the whole practice is
prospectively justified, the benefit of the whole practice always breaks down to the
particular judgements with the consequences I just mentioned. Doris wraps up with
a point that we still have an unresolved substantive and normative dispute regarding
the two level psychology of desert. I will wrap up that we have another factor
influencing whether we will judge a manipulated agent morally responsible or not: if
we have a forward- or backward-looking conception of desert. Or more precisely: If
we consider the benefits as primary in our moral practice and fairness as secondary
or if it is the other way around. Vargas seems to appeal more to the beneficial part
and therefore he judges the manipulated agents often responsible as opposed to
Mele whose intuition would be more aligned with fairness and he prefers not to
blame manipulated agents.
To sum it up, the argument divided philosophers (or at least compatibilists) into two
camps: Those who are taking determinism seriously gave a hard-line reply (that
Plum is responsible in all the cases) and are interpreting the Four-case argument in
a way that responsibility actually transfers from the ordinary case to the others and
not the other way around. For the second camp, the argument is orthogonal,
because their definition of control has nothing to do with the kind of control
required in the basic desert sense. In the light of the reactions, it seems that basic
deserts are a kind of strawman nobody wants to defend. Positions of philosophers
developed and to imagine control as a kind of magical indeterministic sourcehood of
our action in us seems obsolete. In the second camp would be two kinds of
philosophers: those who redefined moral responsibility as beneficial social practice
such as Vargas and those who see ascriptions of moral responsibility as a convention
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not necessarily dependent on our assumed internal structures (as interpreted by
Mele).
3.8 Responsibility of manipulated agents
It seems that in manipulation cases, the control is bypassed. But which part of the
conceptual construction is not fulfilled? It seems not clear, although a good model of
responsible agency should explain it.
In Case 1, Vargas claims that details matter. If the neuroscientists push buttons to
manipulate Plum to start rationally egoistic reasoning, they may do it by altering
inputs while leaving his deliberations and mechanisms of rejection intact. Only if the
agent's reasoning capacity and deliberation mechanisms are micro-managed and
flawed, will Vargas admit that the agent is not responsible105.
But this is problematic, as I argued earlier in this chapter. There could be no
difference between inputs and the deliberation capacity itself. Furthemore, it does
not make sense for Vargas to make this distinction when he already made a claim
that we can be morally responsible in a certain context while not being responsible
in another. That basically means that we have “multiple responsibility capacities”
distinguished by their “aboutness”. Pereboom claims that the neurosurgeons
enhanced Plum’s egoism. If we translate this into Vargas’ terminology, it could mean
that by increasing his egoism they manipulated his detection capacity for altruistic
considerations of kindness or respect. His other detection capacities (for loyalty for
example) could have stayed untouched, but those are not the relevant ones for the
case. In this interpretation, where inputs are the particular moral factors to consider
(e.g. I should behave nicely to Mrs. White), it does not make sense to separate them
from their capacity.
105 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 287
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In another interpretation, we can imagine the inputs being the reasons for the act of
murder.
Pereboom writes that Plum did it for the sake of some personal advantage.
Manipulators could have made him see the advantage big enough to proceed with
the murder. This is closer to real manipulation scenarios. Plum could have been
targeted because his egoism is already high and it would not take too much work to
trigger him to act. The same way in which political advertisements target
neighbourhoods that are already in serious trouble, even Mr Balda from the example
in the introduction could have been targeted by online advertisements based on his
age, political preferences and the number of foreclosures imposed on households in
his area. Does it make a difference if we do not change a person's sensitivity to moral
considerations but instead strengthen the input (or weaken the input that White is
actually worth moral considerations)? Now we are again close to paternalism.
Someone could say that they just took advantage of the fact that Plum is egoistic
and created a situation strong enough for him, so he reveals how low the level of his
inhibitions to actually kill someone is. However, Vargas himself appeals to relevant
circumstances. Why does he not count that the situation was artificially introduced
in any case and it would not happen without the neurosurgeons? Maybe two weeks
later, the method the neurosurgeons are using would be revealed in the media and
he would take steps to never be a victim of them. I am inclined to say that more
details about the neurological process, which Vargas demands, would not help us.
What we need is a more detailed model of responsible agency, which includes how
our capacities are made or changed. Or at least a better picture of relevance, because
every agent has their limits and it does not make any sense to hold agents
responsible in the situations relevantly similar to the extent of classes of moral
considerations playing a role, but take only a complete lack of detectional capacities
as exemptions.
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Also a better concept of internalisation is needed which could explain if it is even
possible for a capacity to be manipulated in a different way than through its inputs.
If there is not such a difference, Vargas will probably hold that manipulated agents
are always responsible, because if agents could be manipulated, they could also
learn from blame.
However, it also may be beneficial to consider brainwashing as numbing our capacity
to recognize reasons and support its victims against the aggressors. One of the
typical propaganda tools is to change our perceptions of certain groups of people or
to strengthen a particular type of our considerations in favor of another. For
example, loyalty considerations are reinforced at the expense of considerations of
kindness. An intense brainwashing flaws our detection of moral considerations in
circumstances related to a particular groups of people and it can even lead to murder
if the manipulator manages to properly dehumanize the groups in someone’s eyes.
The manipulated agent would then claim that context with the dehumanized group
is not relevantly similar to situations where kindness applies and there are already
cases of lawsuits where people claimed to be brainwashed106. If we start looking at
manipulation as a technique for numbing certain types of moral considerations and
count the percentage of its influence instead of exempting only the complete lack of
sensitivity, we can end up with more precise and more beneficial moral practice.
We can also adopt another strategy which could save us from these kinds of
problems. That is why Mele’s historicist account (explained in the next chapter) with
the emphasis on external factors seems appealing. It makes the fuzzy cases of
manipulation more workable if we redirect our attention from complicated
undetectable conceptual structures to external situational factors and say that the
106 Lawyer for accused Capitol rioter says client had 'Foxitis,' 'Foxmania'.
https://thehill.com/homenews/media/552285-lawyer-for-accused-capitol-rioter-says-client-had-foxi
tis-foxmania last access: 6.8.2021
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presence of manipulation itself is a factor making the manipulated agents
not-responsible.
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4. Historical condition for moral responsibility
The discussion about the conditions for moral responsibility was focussed mainly on
the formulation of the internal condition. However, there are philosophers
attempting to include or otherwise consider an external condition in their account,
namely Mele and the team of Fischer and Ravizza. The accounts which are trying to
include it are called historical, because they suppose that an agent needs to have the
right kind of history to be morally responsible - as opposed to structuralist accounts
arguing that we only need to explore agential psychological structures to decide
responsibility. It seems the differences between the accounts create a fruitful
discussion in which some unspoken assumptions about the philosophers' concepts
of moral responsibility could be revealed.
Arguments for the need of external conditions are of two kinds. One kind appeals to
character control and freedom in the moral development of an individual. While it is
hard to define some standards for upbringing and education, the assumption that
there is a need for an individual to have some room to choose their own personality
seems to be plausible. Manipulation arguments of this kind often employ a covert
intervention of nefarious neurosurgeons or evil psychologists which is supposed to
change the agent's value system against their will. The unusual radicality of the
intervention is to bolster the inevitability and non-consensuality of the acquisition
of the new psychological structures. Because the artificial structure in manipulated
agents is the same as in normal ones, it seems to undermine the structuralist
position that the according structure is a sufficient condition for moral
responsibility. Manipulated agents will decide to act according to the internal
condition, but still, they won’t be morally responsible, because of the manipulation
in place.
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A slightly different subgroup of these cases, which may also serve to point out that
something other than the agential psychological structure at the moment matters in
assigning moral responsibility, are divine design cases. The difference is that some
sophisticated being can predict what will happen in the future and prepare initial
conditions to make sure that an agent will do the desired thing without any invasive
action. This is the type of a God-like manipulation as mentioned by Franklin and I
was introducing it with the Zygote argument in the first chapter.
The other kind of arguments showing the need for the external condition for moral
responsibility features so called tracing cases. In cases where we can trace the
sequence of events back to the decision for which the agent is morally responsible, it
doesn’t matter what his psychological structure is at the moment of the action.
Those cases typically feature an agent deciding intentionally to shut down their
control while knowing the risks of doing so. I mentioned them in relation to indirect
responsibility in Vargas’ account.
4.1 Classifications
Externalism about conditions for responsibility & Mele
In his book Responsible Agents, Mele offers a classification, in which we can have an
internal condition and on top of that an external one, a historical one. Mele explains
conditional internalism in Frankfurt’s position:
“An agent’s internal condition at a time may be understood as something specified
by the collection of all psychological truths about the agent at the time that are
silent on how he came to be as he is at that time.”
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It is a sufficient condition. Then he explains conditional externalism as a position
saying that conditional internalism is valid but sometimes agents are responsible
because of how they came to be in the internal condition, i.e. an event prior to the
action we are responsible for, e.g. we decided to drink before driving. Another causal
route can lead to internal conditions, normally associated with responsibility, where
an event on the route causes that the agent is not responsible (see Fig.3.).
Figure 3 - Combinations of the internal condition and responsibility according to Mele
To understand Mele’s defence of conditional externalism, we can show it in contrast
to Vargas’ position. Vargas is not an internalist, but he denies the middle part of our
figure and claims that manipulation is not an exception from moral responsibility.
Historical condition & Vargas
Vargas divides the approaches in a different way: as essentially historical, essentially
structural (or non-historical) and mixed. An essentially structural view is one where
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the agent’s responsibility does not depend on any facts about their history. In
contrast, on essentially historical views, there is always some historical condition
that must be satisfied for an agent to be responsible. “It matters how the agent came
to whatever structural features he or she possesses107”. All the views in the middle he
calls “mixed”.
Vargas declares himself to the mixed position. For him, in some cases structural
conditions will be sufficient, but in others, there will be some historical
requirement. He suggests that we can think about it also as “variantism” about
responsibility depending on some unified story and mentions two reasons to choose
the mixed view. First, it derives from his general approach where he focused on
providing the structural conditions that are ordinarily sufficient for moral
responsibility. However, he claims it is compatible with the above that there may be
historical conditions that independently suffice for free will and moral
responsibility. Second, he wants to make a concession to “tracing” cases (right part
of the figure 3). He says: “A common feature of responsibility practices involves
tracing responsibility for an action past the immediate structure of agency back to
some earlier point in the agent’s history. Drunk driving is one example.”
Based on this explanation, it is clear why Vargas did not include historical condition
among the other three factors (reasons, identity and control) playing a role in our
intuitions about manipulation cases (mentioned in the chapter 2.1). He thinks of it
as an exception to his otherwise structural view. But it does not make the historical
condition less formative for our intuitions about manipulation cases.
4.2 Value manipulation
In One Bad Day108, a manipulation case by Mele, kind Sally is turned into a value
twin of thoroughly bad Chuck by a team of psychologists. As a result, she kills her
108 Mele, Manipulated agents, p.20-21
107 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p.268
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neighbour, George. Chuck and Sally are described as people who worked
intentionally on their character. While Chuck’s “heart hardening” project included
torturing animals, bullying, and killing vulnerable people without mercy (e.g. a
homeless man Don), Sally worked hard to grow up from a petty teenager into the
gentlest person on Earth for whom doing harm to anyone was not even an option.
While Sally slept, Chuck’s values were implanted into her system. On One Bad Day,
she woke up, surprised by her desire to kill George. She found him unpleasant before
but never considered any violence. Sally reflects on her desire and her new system of
values only supports the desire.
After reflection, she satisfies Frankfurt’s structural conditions for being morally
responsible:
● She “has no reservations about her desire” and “is wholeheartedly behind
it109”.
● Her desire is “well integrated into [her] general psychic condition110”.
● Her first-order desires match her second-order desires111.
She decides to kill him and does so. The next night, the evil psychologists undo
everything they had done to her.
Mele explains that the killers, Sally and Chuck, differ markedly in how they came to
have their relevant desires and attitudes, and it also makes Sally a victim of external
forces. According to Frankfurt’s structural account, history makes no difference and
only the internal condition defined by the bullet points above is relevant for moral
responsibility. Mele objects that while we are inevitably fashioned by circumstances
over which we have no control, it doesn’t mean that we have no control at all. Chuck
111 That means she has the desire to kill George and also a second-order desire of wanting to kill
George (as opposed to conflicting first- and second-order desires in which case she would like to get
rid of her desire to kill George).
110 Frankfurt, Reply to John Martin Fischer, p. 27
109 Frankfur, Reply to John Martin Fischer, p. 2
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is morally responsible for an extra item – becoming an evil person, while Sally
excercised no control in the process of acquiring the Chuckian system of values.
This seems to be a counterexample to structural conditions of any kind, because we
can presuppose that manipulated Sally can have any psychological structure
imposed on her against her will, not only the one defined by Frankfurt. Mele
concludes that in order to be a morally responsible agent, there is also a historical
condition - to have a history without manipulation.
There is a similar case introduced by Fischer and Ravizza.112 They claim that the
agent must be responsible for the mechanism that led to the action and a
manipulated agent decides based on a mechanism he has no ownership over.
4.3 One Good Day
One modification of the One Bad Day case introduced by Mele is One Good Day. It
features thoroughly bad Chuck after his heart-hardening project who has no values
at all that could motivate a charitable deed. And exceptionally sweet Beth who
worked hard on her charitable character.
“Overnight, without Chuck’s consent, they erase his bad values and replace
them with good ones that match Sally’s. Shortly after he awakes, he starts
working with a local Habitat for Humanity crew in his neighborhood. When
the workday ends, he drives around town for an hour and buys several boxes
of Girl Scout cookies from every Girl Scout he sees—about fifty boxes in all.
112 Review: Précis of Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility Author(s): John
Martin Fischer, Mark Ravizza, John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza Source: Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Sep., 2000), pp. 441-445 page 442
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Then he delivers the cookies to a local homeless shelter. His motives are pure,
as Sally’s are when she does her charitable deeds.113”
Consistently with his verdict about post-transformation Sally, Mele considers Chuck
not responsible for his good deeds. Vargas’s view on the other hand has no clause
that rules out such value-transformations, so he claims that post-transformation
Chuck in One Good Day as well as post-transformation Sally in One Bad Day are
morally responsible. With appeal to the explanatory power of his account, he holds
that dramatic manipulations that are identity-
and-moral-considerations-responsiveness-preserving should not count as
undermining responsibility.
The hidden assumption of fairness
Mele holds that his intuition that Chuck is not morally responsible for his good
deeds is not misleading based on his radical reversal suggestion. For him, the effort
spent on one’s character matters and Chuck’s pre-transformation character was
sufficiently bad that charitable deeds were not even an option for him114. I believe
that this reveals hidden assumptions about the importance of fairness in his model
of responsible agency. Mele says that "the facts about his history that account for his
moral responsibility for that character”; and “the facts that account for the good
deeds at issue115” suggest that the history at issue is not just something revealing
some unfair and non-consensual invasive character intervention. As I interpret it, it
is also about who did something for the change to happen. This way Chuck received
his good character for free and without any effort. Mele does not mention it
explicitly, but from his formulations, the hidden appreciation of an effort to make
115 Mele, Manipulated agents, p.51
114 Mele, “Moral Responsibility and History Revisited,” p. 473.
113 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p. 29
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something happen is what should have an influence on the resulting moral
responsibility for an action.
Vargas objects that the effort spent on his previous character is not the explanation
of the intuition that post-transformation Chuck is not responsible for his recent
good deeds, but of the intuition that Chuck was responsible for the bad things when
he did them. That means it is not telling one way or another about
post-transformation Chuck. Vargas demands a reason for thinking that those
considerations about pre-transformation properly explain anything about the
post-transformation Chuck, because it may be just habit or prejudice fueling them.
We know that Chuck is bad, we are used to blame him and we can hardly imagine
that he is a good person out of the sudden. There may be a reticence to view Chuck
as praiseworthy, because regarding his wrongs in the past, he does not feel guilty
and he did not try to right his wrongs. Vargas is right that the situation seems
conflicted. According to him if Chuck really is recognizing moral considerations and
self-governing in light of them, he really is praiseworthy for just that reason. If he is
recognizing them and is consistent, he will also regret his past crimes, which is not
mentioned in the example. Vargas thinks that we’re pretty bad about knowing when
and how to praise, implying that even a bad person should be praised for a good
deed and I can only add that there could be some contra-productive social pressure
against praising someone known for his bad deeds. On the other hand, the
interpretation can also be that we know when to praise and how, but we have
different goals in praising.
Vargas and Mele agree on the facts that account for the good deeds at issue, but they
disagree on whether they tell us anything about Chuck. Mele thinks that the facts,
i.e. the role of the manipulators, undermine responsibility. Vargas thinks the only
considerations Mele provides for the accuracy of his intuition that Chuck is not
responsible turn out to be the intuition itself. For me, the underlying concern about
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fairness is clear. Manuel Vargas has an idea to interpret it that one can only be
morally responsible if one is responsible for one’s character, but I consider the
aspect of a fair appreciation or condemnation of a moral effort to be more fitting. It
is in accordance with backward-looking conception of blame to consider fairness in
our ascription of moral responsibility and it has a strong explanatory power
regarding our non-responsibility intuitions in manipulation cases. It is just not fair
to judge the victim, who did not actively choose any steps leading to the outcome.
Maybe in our ordinary praxis, we receive praise or blame for actions that are issued
by a character we did not form actively, but in the presented manipulation cases, the
disbalance seems obvious.
In addition, Vargas mentions that the condition of responsibility for one’s character
would be a sufficient but not necessary condition of moral responsibility in Mele’s
account116.
How to manipulate values
The first objection to the examples of value manipulation could be that we don’t
know that value manipulation is possible even in principle. The possibility will
depend on our model of thoughts. If we are representationalists, it seems plausible
or at least imaginable that something such as values could be manipulated or
replaced in us by some kind of advanced technology, because distinct objects in the
world have distinct representations in our mind. However, according to some
associationist theories of thought it makes much less sense. Associationist theories
hold that an organism's causal history, agent’s experience, is the main factor
creating agential cognitive architecture by learning117. It means that our
psychological structure basically is our history and the only way to replace it is to
create some new history, new associations and new neural links which will become
stronger than the old ones. It is related to the issue of learning to recognize moral
117 What is Associationism? in Associationist Theories of Thought
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/associationist-thought/#WhaAss , last access: 5.8.2021, First
published Tue Mar 17, 2015; substantive revision Wed Jun 24, 2020
116 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p.299
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considerations I mentioned in the previous chapter. I could only theorize that value
manipulation would rather happen through a long process in isolation and radical
change would be possible overnight only if the nefarious neurosurgeons have a
machine with time-controlling technology or if we blast Sally in the space, where we
prepare a lot of very strong and painful experiences for her to change her
personality. For me, this is more fantasy than science fiction, so I would consider it
impossible.
4.4 Where do their positions meet or differ?
In Building Better Beings Vargas mentions that he was previously inclined to think
that Mele’s account was an essentially historical one, because in his early works
Mele uniformly appeals to a no-compulsion constraint. However, Vargas adds that
threads of Mele’s early account also suggested the following possibility: he could
allow that possession or rare or exceptional agential powers might be sufficient for
responsibility.
In context of agents globally manipulated by evil neurosurgeons, Vargas writes:
“If Mele thinks that the paradigmatic or model agential structure required for
responsibility is one in which an agent’s relevant desires are sheddable,
then what I have been calling his “negative historical condition” is
really the tracing condition of a [mixed] account. On the other hand, if
Mele does not think that there is any such requirement on the basic agential
structure of responsibility, then his theory does count as a genuinely
historical one. A case that is worth thinking about in this context is one
where an agent has only sheddable desires—if Mele thinks that these
structural properties (plus whatever other structural properties he thinks are
required for responsible agency) are enough to make the agent a responsible
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agent, then on my way of thinking about these things, he is a mixed theorist.
Given his stated account of compulsion, I am inclined to think that this is
what he should say.118”
What does it mean? No-compulsion requirement suggests always looking into
history but if we have the power to reflect and change our values at any time, we
have a potential to undo any compulsion and the historical condition is losing
importance.
Mele introduces an opposite term, unsheddable values. For him, values are
understood as psychological states. If we have X as a value, we believe in it and
desire it at the same time. One may shed a value either by eradicating it or by
significantly attenuating it. We can persuade ourselves that X is not that good or
diminish our desire by reflection. If we extinguish such a desire completely, we have
eradicated the value119. However, if values are unsheddable, they run deep and we
cannot eradicate them easily.
“An hour of careful reflection may be enough to disabuse oneself of an
unwarranted belief that something is good, and an hour of sustained effort to
weaken a desire by employing a self-control technique one has learned may
suffice to weaken it significantly. But unsheddable values, as I understand
them, are much more resistant to significant change than that.120"
They are supposed to be very firmly entrenched parts of the valuer’s psyche.
“I will say that any agent who is stuck in this way with a value (during t) is
practically unable to shed it (during t). Values that one is practically unable to shed
120 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 44
119 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 42
118 “On the Importance of History for Responsible Agency,” Philosophical Studies 127, no. 3 (2006):
376 n. 18.
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may be termed practically unsheddable”121. He went on to say that “The notion of
ability at work here is similar to one implicit in commonsense conceptions of
irresistible desires”122.
However, if an agent's desires are sheddable, there is no need to look into history,
because agents can create their desires at any time.
Mele gave answer to Vargas’ considerations by introducing Mabel123. Mabel is an
agent with “the marvelous ability to produce in herself any conceptually possible
system of values from moment to moment” and thus, “can undo the effects of value
manipulation at any moment.124” By acknowledging the theoretical existence of such
agents, Mele validates the search for internal conditions although his own approach
is more practical and history dependent. The section above, describing Mele’s
classification from Manipulated Agents published in 2019, confirms this
interpretation125.
The interesting question here is whether there are any other presumptions in which
Vargas and Mele differ and which make Mele focus way more on historical
conditions or if it’s just their respective research preferences. For sure, we can tell
that Mele’s argumentative approach is from positions of intuitions and interhuman
praxis, whereas Vargas is trying to construct a full working concept of moral
responsibility. I believe that these diverse approaches are valuable. Mele’s work
plays an important role in keeping the feet of those who are trying to construct a full
theory on the ground. Trying to make a complete theory, such as Vargas’s, is also an
125 Vargas’s book Building Better Beings, where he first mentioned the hypothesis that Mele’s
position could be consistent with conditional internalism, was published in 2013.
124 Mele, Manipulated agents, p. 15
123 first: Alfred Mele, “Moral Responsibility and History Revisited,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
12, no. 5 (2009): 468., second in MA
122 ibid. p. 154
121 Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995), p. 153
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important approach, because only full theories will help us make sense of the
robustness and complexity of the problem we are working with.
What motivates Vargas to pursue the internal condition even though agents like us
ordinarily lack Mabel’s marvelous power? Vargas concludes that both he and Mele
are mixed theory proponents. However, he adds that they are on the different poles
of a continuum and he, unlike Mele, thinks that conditions sufficient for moral
responsibility can ordinarily be satisfied without requiring satisfaction from some
historical condition126. He emphasizes capacities to recognize and self-govern in
light of moral considerations, which are more readily had127. In Mele’s account,
however, the cases where historical condition doesn’t matter are rare or even only
theoretical.
Methodological differences
Another point to make is that they differ in the amount of importance they are
giving to intuitions about the manipulation cases. Vargas’s overall strategy towards
intuitions is that they should not necessarily shape our accounts. They may be
erroneous and if our prescriptive theory of moral responsibility offers a better
solution, we should abandon them128.
Mele’s arguments are often based on the fact that the majority of people have a
strong intuition that an agent is not morally responsible in manipulation cases.
Vargas agrees that it’s important to pursue why people have those intuitions, but
unlike Mele, he doesn’t think that they show us any important clues, but rather a
128 Ibid. p.297
127 ibid. p.299
126 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p.297
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common understanding which can turn out to be totally misleading. He writes that
we need a proper theory behind it.
I would say that Mele’s approach is more statistical, exploring the current state of
the art of moral responsibility practices. He relies on the assumption that folk’s
intuitions developed for a reason, even though the body of prevalent beliefs about
moral responsibility may be a bit out of date.
Vargas’ approach aims to go beyond folk’s intuitions and provide a theory, which is
not only explanative, but also forms our intuitions based on the definitions and
concepts it offers. He supposes that the majority of intuitions could be misleading
and it’s a task of a philosopher to help people overcome biases by a proper theory.
To sum it up, according to Vargas we don’t know if the intuitions are reliable or
truth-guiding, even though they may be widespread. Mele thinks at least that we
should not discard them since they may show us a valid approach alternative to
theoretizing which should be included in our theory. He writes:
“I certainly am not suggesting that intuitions are the final word on philosophical
matters. Sometimes we find that our intuitions clash with the intuitions of others.
When that happens, there often is room for discussion and progress [...] If we were
to set intuitions aside entirely, we would be significantly reducing our resources
[...].”
4.5 Personal Identity
Radical transformations of values, like the one seen in One Good Day, invite
questions about personal identity. This is a more serious objection present in more
manipulation case discussions, but I will provide just Vargas’ explanation:
84
“[Another] variable that affects how we think about these cases one’s theory of
personal identity over time. If one operates with a psychological conception of
personal identity, where one’s identity over time (or perhaps just one’s continuity) is
secured by overlapping psychological ties, then the more dramatic the manipulation
the more likely it is that we will have disrupted identity or continuity conditions.129”
In other words, depending on our conception of personal identity, identity may or
may not survive the manipulation. If it does not survive, we will have to ascribe
moral responsibility to two different persons: pre-manipulation and
post-manipulation one.
4.6 Why historicism and why not?
Motivation for historicism could be fairness, securing that agents are excused from
responsibility in situations over which they have no control in a non-coercive but
still very radical sense. As I wrote in the introduction, some mild influence and
nudging is acceptable manipulation. But does it make sense to hold a globally
manipulated agent responsible? In global manipulation cases, it seems like they
have no way of knowing about the manipulation nor a way to prevent it next time.
It seems to me that the distinction between external and internal conditions for
moral responsibility is not that important. There may be practical benefits in
looking for clues in the external environment and examining an agent's historical
upbringing or traces of psychologists breaking into the house rather than trying to
assess an agent's psychological structure. Yes, it is a good strategy of structuralists
to say that moral responsibility depends on an agent’s psychology at the time. At
least conceptually. I hope it will be possible in the future to work with a model of
agential psyche, but right now we would have a hard time even telling if the agent is
mentally ill or not. It seems to be conceptually easy to say that a mentally ill person
129 Ibid. p.279
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or someone who lacks a particular psychological structure is not morally responsible
but what if there’s no such a thing as a psychological structure in the sense we
presuppose it? Or at least, what if there is no way of assigning a particular content
to a particular brain activity? In combination with unreliability of agent’s self
assessment we are out of methods at the moment.
It is already the prevailing opinion among scientists that the experiments do not
prove what they aimed to prove and the monitored brain signal merely shows a
readiness potential and attention. From the experiments that followed it was clear
that the signal was the same whether subjects chose to flick or not.
Regardless of the elegance of the psychological structure hypothesis, it would be
better to suppose only a behavioral model of the same thing saying that the agent is
responsible if they would act the same way in a similar situation. Then we can
distinguish the shades of moral responsibility - if an agent would act the same way
in the same possible world, a similar world without manipulation or in the same
situation at a different time. Why argue if a conceptual model is internal or external
if it’s only an abstract model?
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5. Conclusions
5.1 The three approaches to moral responsibility of
manipulated agents
Moral responsibility is complex. There seem to be many ways to look at it and
Frankfurt’s Real Self account, Mele’s historicism and Vargas’ Reasons account are
approaching the problem from very different angles. Even the question “Is a
manipulated agent morally responsible?” appears to have a different meaning for
each of them. Frankfurt is interested in the attributability of the behavior to the
agent’s real self based on his current mental state, Mele addresses whether the agent
is accountable in a fair, backward-looking way, and Vargas tackles the problem of the
beneficial agency cultivation model. In that context, it is not surprising that they
offer different answers to the question of the manipulated agent’s responsibility:
yes, no, maybe. It almost seems that the best we can do is to take the ambiguous
term of moral responsibility as just an umbrella term for many different problems of
human agency. We can then break the discussion down into sub-discussions about
moral responsibility and the extent to which:
(1) I was truly choosing the action on my own without doubts;
(2) I was accountable for the action given the circumstances and history; and
(3) it would be beneficial for me to get the blame.
I believe that particular approaches can make more or less sense depending on the
situation. After all, it looks like all the scenarios abstracted from who is making the
judgement. The judge has some kind of a relationship to the manipulated agent and
is prompted to judge by it. In a random encounter where we do not care about the
agent’s real self or fair accountability offering a snap judgement of blame is maybe
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the right kind of feedback and we may even be considered nice to care (because as
Vargas wrote, blaming could be costly130). But if our goal is to cultivate fairness,
whether from the position of a theorist, a code of conduct author, or a teacher
forming the rules in a class, we should also consider historical factors. The Real Self
point of view in turn plays a role in knowing the character of the agent - it is
supposed to distinguish behavior issuing from someone’s heart from loosely held
courses of actions chosen due to random ideas. All the three approaches have their
strengths and weaknesses and there are optimal situations to use each of them.
Although the Real Self account seems to be less relevant for our ordinary moral
practice, it is valid in relationships based on a deep analysis of agent’s motivations
(in psychological praxis or close relationships).
Moreover, by attributing moral responsibility, we assume all sorts of concepts which
are not included in models of responsible agency such as the one of Vargas’: a moral
theory, social contract or at least expectations imposed on agents, decision-making
process and the process of adoption of reasons which play a role in it, and a lot
more. Some of the assumptions are made explicitly: abstracting from moral theories
or taking moral responsibility as blameworthiness. But reactions to manipulation
cases show that there are other factors implicit to our theories which have the final
word in granting the judgement about moral responsibility. The open discussion
about those implicit factors and assumptions is missing, e.g. the extent to which
fairness plays a role for each philosopher. I would also consider the decision-making
process to be the weak point of most of the theories. The way philosophers handle
psychological concepts such as desires, values and reasons is alarming. Values are
not interchangeable constants used in reflection for validating our desires as Mele
suggests. Vargas’ model of responsible agency has some details, but it still fails to
capture manipulation. What sense does a model make of responsible agency if it
130 Vargas, Building Better Beings, p.242
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lacks enough detail to explain where manipulated agents fail to control their
decisions?
Because of the missing model of decision-making process and missing
understanding of how it could possibly be impaired by the influence of others,
including manipulation among the negative conditions for moral responsibility
could be a better approach.
It redirects the effort to examining the external traces that manipulation happened.
Moral progress could be another reason to treat manipulated agents the same way as
coerced agents. We can imagine that a more advanced society is one where we know
what manipulation looks like and we go after manipulators to keep the balance,
because manipulators are the agents who need to be changed, not the victims.
The argument against treating manipulation as a negative condition for moral
responsibility is that emphasizing individual responsibility could be beneficial for
society as a prevention against manipulation in general. Agents could learn the
tricks manipulators use and navigate themselves out of dangerous situations
without depending on institutional protection. But if something already happened,
it seems reasonable to put the pressure mainly on the manipulator, not on the
victim, to prevent the practice from happening again. What, if anything, is there
that could be used as a basis for blaming the manipulated agent? In the case of
misinformation, a lot of tools for verification of information and a number of
analyses already exist. The agent could be blamed for ignoring them e.g. before
sharing some propaganda, or (such as in the case of Mr Balda) commiting a crime
based on that misinformation. At least this is definitely something a manipulated
agent should be blamed for. However, it is hard to tell in global manipulation cases,
where there is no common knowledge that the threat even exists, let alone the
availability of tools to avert its consequences.
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5.2 Further development
I have considered two main factors (or maybe two types) of control: character
control and volitional control. The requirement that manipulation cases place on
morally responsible agency models is that they should have a component where they
may be impaired and as a result not fulfilling the control condition. Mele explains
sufficiently that in case of radical reversals the character control is impaired due to
lost access to a carefully built system of values, something actively chosen by the
agent, and thus it is unfair to blame them for acts issued from values that were
imposed on them. I believe that the pressure on Vargas to find space for something
similar in his theory is justified. Distinguishing non-standard psychological
structures created in agents under pressure seems crucial to model manipulated
agents. But Vargas does not seem to perceive the need to add more detail to his
model and explain how the reasons (or values) are created in it. He proudly claims to
be a structuralist. Even though the bare fact of an agent’s reason-responsiveness or
lack thereof does not explain much regarding manipulation cases, if we do not state
how the ability was acquired. Another plausible strategy for him could be to stick
with his forward-looking interpretation of blame and claim that we do not need to
exclude manipulated agents from moral responsibility, because in our social practice
only the resulting benefits of blame matter. But he did not choose this approach
either and is insisting on the claim that all reasons-responsive agents are morally
responsible.
The threshold of moral responsibility for manipulated agents is extremely hard to
find, because they appear to have all the capacities needed to be morally responsible
for their decisions. Certain treatments seem to reduce the question of moral
responsibility into a binary decision, where any degree of moral responsibility is
treated the same.
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But this convenient reduction glosses over the heart of the matter: A premeditated
immoral act is different from the behavior of a manipulated agent who is merely
guilty of negligence. Equating them only obscures our understanding of moral
agency principles.
I would argue in favor of further research on agential psychological structure, but I
am also sceptical that a single demarcation criterion for moral responsibility can be
found. Exclusion then seems to be the practical thing to do. This leaves us with
Mele’s approach. Excluding manipulated agents from moral responsibility is a
convention. It is also a practical solution, because while there is no way to examine
psychological states at the time of the action, we can look for traces of manipulation
the same way we investigate coercion.
It is already the case that recorded threats serve as evidence against the aggressor
and exonerate the victim. The same way online media policies could be based on
recording what content the manipulated agent was exposed to and limits could be
set for what counts as brainwashing.
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